Showing posts with label Make In India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Make In India. Show all posts

Thursday, 4 August 2016

GST: Adding Edge to Exports


The GST will not only advance domestic market efficiencies but also add teeth to India’s economic diplomacy by improving the ease of doing business and enhancing competitiveness for exports.


The passage of the Constitution (122nd amendment) Bill, 2014, on Wednesday allows for the launch of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), a unified and pan-national tax structure. GST will create a common domestic market, remove distortions arising out of a multiplicity of levies and rates, and foster efficiency by minimizing the cascading effect of taxes in the manufacturing chain. GST will also have a beneficial impact on India’s economic diplomacy, including foreign trade.

The GST fits nicely into the Modi government’s drive to improve ease-of-doing business in the ‘Make In India’ campaign. Manifold taxes, with differential rates in different states, created hurdles for the smooth conduct of business and added costs at every stage, frustrating foreign investors. Foreign Investment decisions and the expected rate of return from projects often suffered due to these distortions, occasionally even deterring fresh investment plans. Most global value chains, with the exception of Foxconn, have avoided investing in India because of regulatory and bureaucratic tangles, especially those related to the multi-layered tax regime.

The successful implementation of GST will reverse this, helping to attract new investments especially from global value chains which often aggregate inputs from different constituencies.

The other immediate beneficiary will be Indian exports which have long suffered from lack of international competitiveness due to differential taxes and the energies expended on complying with the complex tax labyrinth. A 2010 report from National Council of Applied Economic Research had found that eliminating cascading taxes on exports could increase GDP growth by 0.9-1.7 per cent.[1]

For instance, a garments manufacturer and exporter has to depend on multiple suppliers of inputs – finished cloth (processed and dyed), threads, buttons, zips, sewing machines, ironing products, packaging, labels – for producing his finished good. These suppliers in turn, source raw materials from multiple sources, located in multiple locations, each party paying multiple taxes in different tax jurisdictions. At each stage, goods get delayed in transit for assessment and payment of varied levies – sales tax, octroi, excise, service tax. This fosters inefficiency and adds costs to each additional layer for the exporter. In addition, with each state legislating separate laws, meant that exporters couldn’t claim full set-off on the free-on-board price, rendering exports uncompetitive.

GST will alleviate this. The Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) for 2015-20 says: “The simplification and harmonization of the indirect tax regime of the country will reduce the cost of production and lead to a seamless, integrated Indian market, thereby making Indian trade and industry more competitive.”[2]

The benefit to services exports will become clearer in the next few weeks, but right away, the travel, tourism and hospitality sector is a clear winner because of its dependence on a wide spectrum of vendors and suppliers.

As the implications and impact of this simplifiying legislation starts to make itself apparent and the GST’s advantages for incoming foreign investment and out-going exports gain momentum, it will add veracity to Prime Minister Modi’s on-going economic diplomacy efforts.

This feature was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. It can also be read here.


References
[1] National Council for Applied Economic Research, Moving to Goods and services Tax in India: Impact on India’s Growth and International Trade, December 2009,<http://fincomindia.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/oldcommission_html/fincom13/discussion/report28.pdf>

[2] Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, Foreign Trade Policy Statement, <http://dgft.gov.in/exim/2000/FTPstatement2015.pdf>

Saturday, 1 August 2015

Busting Myths Around Raghuram Rajan's RBI

There is no definitive proof that lower interest rates will lead unquestionably to higher economic growth.

The revised Indian Financial Code, put in the public domain by Finance Ministry, has divided economists, observers and experts into two distinct, sharply-delineated camps. On one side are those who are desperate to clip the Reserve Bank governor’s wings, and on the other are those who want his unspoken, uncovenanted autonomy to remain untouched, uncompromised. 

In the midst of this brouhaha, discussions about reforming the central bank’s governance framework has fallen through the cracks. While the debate about reducing the Governor’s powers rages endlessly, there is little attention being paid to what happens even after the change is effected. The Governor will still be answerable only to Finance Minister, and not to Parliament or a select committee of Parliament, as is the practice in many countries and as it should be in India too. It is surprising that this aspect of central bank reforms has failed to merit any discussion.

The revised code, among other things, has suggested that monetary policy, the exclusive preserve of central banks all over the world, should be decided by a monetary policy committee. Today, the final decision vests with the governor who, after consulting multiple bodies and committees, then has the sole discretionary power to take any monetary action. It is the composition of this recommended committee that has got people worked up. According to the revised code, the committee should have the RBI governor in the chair, two more RBI employees and four “persons appointed by the Central Governor”. Moreover, each member will have one vote and decisions will be taken on the basis of majority vote. 

With four votes, the government’s nominees immediately constitute a majority. Even more sinister is Article 257 in the code, which enjoins the Central government to nominate one representative to the meeting. This representative will not have a vote but will participate in the committee’s deliberations and will read out a statement from the government at the meeting. The import of this is not lost: with a representative watching the proceedings and delivering the central government’s message at the meeting, will any government nominee dare go against New Delhi’s wishes?

Arguments have been made that, in a democracy, the executive should have some say over a critical economic function like monetary policy. There is a basic flaw with this argument; separation of powers is a fundamental tenet of democracy, especially where the government’s actions can have an abiding impact on people’s lives. The inflationary stickiness arising from the 2008-09 stimulus programme is still haunting the Indian economy. Unlike the thick, Constitutional boundary separating the legislature from the judiciary, the line segregating the executive and the central bank is thin and rooted more in convention and common economic sense. 

It has become fashionable for economists of a certain orientation to demand reduced powers for the central bank governor. There are a couple of problems with that. First, under the new contract signed between RBI and the government, RBI is responsible for ensuring that consumer inflation remains within a pre-determined band. If the Governor ’s powers to use monetary tools to achieve that objective are taken away, then it somehow nullifies the inflation contract.

Second, the Indian economy has always been marked by fiscal dominance, which has been cogently explained by Niranjan Rajadhyaksha (http://goo.gl/3uwpz4) in his column for newspaper Mint. In simple words, monetary policy in India has always followed fiscal policy. The government’s fiscal policy, resulting in fiscal deficits, has forced the central bank to fashion monetary policy with the objective of tackling the after-effects of fiscal excesses. The RBI has worked hard over the past 25 years to minimise the deleterious impact of government’s profligacy on monetary policy. The government, in seeking to control both fiscal and monetary policies now, will negate all that has been achieved in stabilising the economy.

At the heart of the demand to shift the reins of monetary policy is a popular myth: reducing interest rates will automatically stimulate economic growth. Like all myths, especially those relating to flying machines of antiquity, there is no definitive scientific — or statistical — proof that lower interest rates will lead unquestionably to higher economic growth. Interestingly, another prevalent myth about the Indian economy being “decoupled” from the global economy evaporated quite rapidly after 2009. 

Many economists and industry lobbies have been incensed by RBI’s refusal to lower interest rates. Former RBI governor D Subbarao raised interest rates 13 times in quick succession. It was hoped his successor, Raghuram Rajan, would be divorced from such “anti-growth” orthodoxies. And, even though he has lowered interest rates, the pace has not been found too satisfactory. 

Beyond myths, a softer interest rate regime definitely has some side benefits: lower interest rates will automatically reduce the debt servicing burden of many large corporates which have borrowed way beyond their digestive capacities. While the RBI has been critical about the mounting levels of sticky loans in bank books and the behavioural patterns displayed by corporate borrowers, the government believes the investment cycle — especially “Make In India” — will not revive unless this staggering debt mass is sorted out.

Finally, the revised code employs some rather curious appellations: for example, it keeps referring to the RBI governor as “chairperson”. For example, Article 256(2)(a) says the monetary policy committee will comprise “the Reserve Bank Chairperson as its chairperson”. Last time I checked, RBI had no chairperson. He doesn’t exist even in the RBI Act.

Courtesy Outlook magazine: http://goo.gl/V1IALu 

Friday, 24 April 2015

Public Procurement: Policy Must Precede Law

Pressure for a unified public procurement framework is mounting on India from both within the country and internationally. While an integrated procurement structure is necessary, a broad policy architecture must precede the framing of any legislation

As India prepares to convert some of its free trade agreements into larger comprehensive agreements, it will have to re-examine some existing domestic rules and convert other rules into legislations. And in some cases, such as procurement by the government, it will have to first frame guiding principles that are aligned with global norms.

Comprehensive agreements usually include, apart from export and import rules, treaties on investment, intellectual property rights, and public procurement. All comprehensive agreements, and some bilateral investment treaties, demand that public procurement treat all vendors—foreign or domestic—equally. In keeping with these norms, India too will have to design a globally-aligned public procurement framework that is fair and equitable.

The Indian government’s annual procurement bill is enormous. If purchases by the Centre, states, local bodies, public sector organisations, and the armed forces are consolidated, various estimates put the total bill anywhere between 25% and 30% of the country’s GDP, amounting to over $600 billion. [1]

Despite this colossal bill, India does not have an over-arching policy to guide public procurement.

In theory, all public procurement is guided by General Financial Rules (1963) and Delegation of Financial Powers Rules of 1978, both framed (and occasionally updated) by the Ministry of Finance. [2, 3] The ministry has also published a manual called “Policies and Procedures for Purchase of Goods”. [4] On top of that, the centralised purchase department of the central government—the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals—issues its own guidelines. Many ministries often tweak these rules, with government agencies developing their own rules, and framing model tender documents.

Defence procurement, on the other hand, is covered by a unique set of policies and procedures formulated by the National Security System, and the decisions are made by the Defence Acquisition Council. In addition, many states have legislated their own procurement Bills—for example, the Tamil Nadu Public Procurement Act, the Karnataka Public Procurement Act, and the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Act.

Given this wide variation in procurement rules within the government, regulation and supervision are casualties. While the Central Vigilance Commission provides supplementary regulations and oversight, with additional supervision by the Comptroller and Auditor General, there is no central authority that monitors public procurement to ensure compliance with existing rules.

A series of scandals—coupled with mounting pressure from international allies, trade partners, and multilateral organisations—forced the UPA-II government to draft a Public Procurement Bill in 2012. But that didn’t go anywhere, and the new government is now trying to resuscitate the Bill. The finance ministry has invited comments on the draft of the existing Bill. [5]

However, there is a problem with drafting legislation before articulating guiding principles, or a strategy architecture, or even a white paper. Such a model document can provide directional guidance to the Bill, and not vice-versa. Also, guiding principles enjoy greater longevity, which when incorporated into legislation, saves it from frequent, time-consuming amendments.

Tactically, such a document will help resolve numerous pending or unresolved policy-related issues in public procurement that a Bill cannot incorporate.

For starters, the proposed Bill applies to only procurement by the central government and its various organisations. Given the growing procurement costs of states and local bodies (such as municipal corporations or panchayats), this Bill then serves only a limited purpose. Any regulatory oversight over purchases by states and local bodies would need to be balanced with the tenets of federalism.

This can be debated in the guiding principles and an alternative solutions framework can be constructed. For instance, it might be instructive to integrate all public procurement—at whatever level—with the proposed technology backbone for the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime. Aligning procurements with the GST backbone will also allow for fair comparisons between the pricing of similar goods and services procured elsewhere by private or public entities, thereby imparting transparency and accountability. This will then reduce divergence without the need to legislate a central bill.

Second, governments worldwide use public procurement strategically to drive their socio-economic agendas. In India, there is a 20% mandatory carve-out for the micro, small medium enterprises (MSME) segment. [6] This will raise questions about other exemptions, such as a legitimate gender-based quota—should it be part of the 20% or does it deserves separate reservation? With gender budgeting now well established, gender-based public procurement has the opportunity to improve female entrepreneurship, employment, and incomes. [7]

A reservation—known as offsets—has also been included in defence FDI to supplement the ‘Make in India’ programme, under which foreign companies manufacturing in India must source 30% of goods and services from local companies. Even the FDI policy on single brand retail mandates such a requirement. These exceptions might face opposition in comprehensive agreement negotiations. This reinforces the need for a national policy debate, and a broad strategy, which re-examines the extent of exemptions that can be allowed.

Any strategy’s most significant thrust will be in the geoeconomic sphere. For instance, India will probably want to exempt government’s procurement of foodgrains from Indian farmers from any comprehensive negotiations, at least till the Doha Round of discussions under the World Trade Organisation are concluded, or till the outdated WTO formula on agriculture support is overhauled.

Importantly, India also needs a strategy to gain greater market access for services in overseas markets, in exchange for a liberal, domestic public procurement policy in manufactured goods. Public procurement of services in most countries is restricted to citizens of a country, or a particular bloc (like Europe). India should leverage the growing clamour for access to its procurement market by seeking reciprocal access for its services.

This is a plan of action that cannot be included in a Bill, but needs to be outlined in a strategy document.

References

[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, India: Probity in Public Procurement,

<http://www.unodc.org/documents/southasia/publications/research-studies/India-PPPs.pdf>

[2] Ministry of Finance, Government of India, General Financial Rules, <http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_expenditure/GFRS/index.asp>

[3] Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Delegation of Financial Power Rules, <http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_expenditure/notification/dfpower/Purchase%20I.pdf>

[4] Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Policies and Procedures for Purchase of Goods, <http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_expenditure/acts_codes/MPProc4ProGod.pdf>

[5] Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Notice: Public Procurement Bill, 6 April 2015, <http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_expenditure/ppcell/PPDNotice180315.pdf>

[6] Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of India, Public Procurement Policy Notification, <http://dcmsme.gov.in/notification.pdf>

[7] Kirton, Raymond Mark, Gender, Trade and Public Procurement Policy: Kenya, India, Australia, Jamaica. The Commonwealth, 2012, <http://assets.thecommonwealth.org/assetbank-commonwealth/action/viewAsset?id=22979&index=0&total=36&view=viewSearchItem#imageModal>

Monday, 20 April 2015

Do Trade Targets Work?

India has used two-way trade targets as a proxy for judging the temperature of its key bilateral and plurilateral relationships. But a deeper understanding is needed of the extent to which physical targets can help accomplish qualitative objectives

The government of India’s new Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) for 2015-2020 has set a $900-billion goods and services export target, to be achieved by 2020. Compared with the $465.9 billion achieved during 2013-14, the target is almost double of current levels.

The policy document prefaces the target with a rare pithy statement: “A vision is best achieved through measurable targets.”[1] But the fact is, most of India’s key diplomatic engagements—at bilateral, plurilateral, or even multilateral levels—are defined by targets.

Targets are ubiquitous in India’s economic diplomacy. There are many ways to judge the breadth and depth of a relationship between two countries, including cultural exchanges, defence cooperation, people-to-people interaction, and historical ties. But trade and investment targets lay out vector paths for future growth, and set concrete milestones against which progress can be gauged.

The target-driven approach is now spreading to bilateral ties with even smaller nations; for example, India and Vietnam recently agreed to a trade target of $15 billion, to be met by 2020. [2]

But targets are essentially cut-and-dry, and temporal. There is no definitive research showing whether targets have succeeded in imparting additional meaning to an existing relationship, or whether they have been effective in bringing two disparate nation-states closer. In other words, there’s no conclusive evidence showing that quantifiable bounds improve the qualitative facet of an engagement.

India’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN is a good example. It has been a source of anxiety within government and key stakeholders. India signed the FTA for goods in 2009, but the one on services and investment—arguably India’s strong point—is yet to come into force. Even in the goods trade, India suffers a chronic trade deficit with ASEAN: it imports more than it exports.

In the face of this, the target for India-ASEAN bilateral trade—$100 billion by 2015—looks unattainable, especially since two-way trade (exports plus imports) between the two regions amounted to only $70.5 billion during April-February 2014-15. [3]

Confronted by this glacial pace of trade growth, India has done the next best thing: it has stretched out both the physical target as well the end-date. The India-ASEAN relationship will now be measured by a new target without having to necessarily address performance vis-a-vis the earlier target. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj announced the new target at the inaugural session of Delhi Dialogue VII on March 11: “However, we need to make a special effort to achieve our target of enhancing trade to $100 billion by 2015, and our aspiration is to double it to $200 billion by 2022.” [4]

India has recast other targets in other strategic relationships as well. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi first state visit to the U.S. in September 2014, the joint statement he issued with President Barack Obama stated: “Noting that two-way trade has increased five-fold since 2001 to nearly $100 billion, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi committed to facilitate the actions necessary to increase trade another five-fold.” [5] In other words, to take trade to $500 billion, though the statement refrained from mentioning a target year.

In the other strategic relation with neighbour China, there is some clarity of objectives on both investments and trade. A joint statement issued by Modi and President Xi Jinping in September 2014 announced: “The Chinese side would also endeavour to realise an investment of $20 billion in India in the next 5 years in various industrial and infrastructure development projects”. [6] During the same trip, a five-year Trade and Economic Development Plan signed between the two countries has, among other targets, an unquantified over-riding objective: reduce the trade imbalance India suffers in its $65-billion bilateral trade with China. [7]

Even with Africa, the $90-billion target set for 2015 is likely to be missed. [8] It is also quite likely that the target will be bumped up—both the volume as well the year. This might be announced at the Third India-Africa Summit scheduled for October 2015.

When the foreign trade and investment landscape is suffused with a surfeit of targets, the logical questions are: How are targets fixed? What is the strategy for meeting them? No one knows the answers.

For one, there is no clarity on who should set and announce targets—the commerce ministry or the external affairs ministry? While think tanks and academic experts are known to have been engaged by both ministries to finalise targets, the research output is not available to civil society, either for viewing or for providing inputs. Inviting public comments before finalising targets, or even to assess the methodology used, can probably infuse some realism into these exercises.

Second, once the targets are announced, there is no detailed analysis of how these will be met, and no outlining of strategy, at least not in the public domain.

Finally, this year’s Foreign Trade Policy also raises a crucial issue that has bedevilled India’s trade practices: the lack of coordination between different economic agents as well as ministries operating in silo-like structures. But then the policy stops short of mentioning how “Make in India” or “Digital India” or even the policy on smart cities can be integrated with the FTP to deliver higher exports of both goods and services. That remains the biggest challenge for India’s trade regime.




References


[1] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India; Foreign Trade Policy Statement, <http://dgft.gov.in/exim/2000/FTPstatement2015.pdf>, p.14

[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Joint Statement by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung,28 October 2014, <http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24143/Media+Statements+by+Prime+Minister+of+India+and+Prime+Minister+of+Vietnam+in+New+Delhi+October+28+2014>

[3] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Trade Statistics, <http://commerce.nic.in/ftpa/cntq.asp>

[4] Swaraj, Sushma, Keynote Address at Inaugural Session of Delhi Dialogue VII,Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 11 March 2015,

<http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24899/Keynote_Address_by_External_Affairs_Minister_at_the_Inaugural_Session_of_Delhi_Dialogue_VII_New_Delhi>

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Joint statement by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi & U.S.A. President Barack Obama, 30 September 2014,

<http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24051/Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_USA>

[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership, 19 September 2014,

<http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htmdtl/24022/Joint_Statement_between_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China_on_Building_a_Closer_Developmental_Partnership>


[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, List of Documents signed during the State Visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India, 18 September 2014, <http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?24012/List+of+Documents+signed+during+the+State+Visit+of+Chinese+President+Xi+Jinping+to+India>

[8] Singhal, Rajrishi; Indian Banks in Africa: Change Agents; Policy Perspective No 8, Gateway House: Indian Counmcil on Global Relations, 9 January 2015, 
<http://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Policy-Perspective_Economic-diplomacy-with-Africa.pdf>



Monday, 2 March 2015

Budget 2015: No Heed to Economic Diplomacy

Finance minister Arun Jaitley’s 2015-16 Budget resonates only partially with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s arc of economic diplomacy; it lacks strategic intent that could invest India with some geo-strategic heft in the years to come


Soon after he was sworn in as Prime Minister, Narendra Modi invested India’s languishing economic diplomacy with a renewed energy. It was therefore widely expected that Budget-2015 would achieve strategic convergence with Modi’s vision of using economics to drive India’s foreign policy. But the Budget seems to have achieved that only partially.

Economic diplomacy has a two-pronged role in the Indian economy. One, to open up markets for Indian goods, services and investments, with special emphasis on widening and deepening India’s footprint in neighbouring countries and newer markets like Africa and Latin America. Two, Modi’s whirlwind foreign engagements in the first eight months of his premiership were also focused on attracting foreign inward investments — from governments as well as the private sector — to further invigorate his “Make In India” programme.

On the first count, the Budget is conspicuously silent. It is on the second that the Budget holds out some hope.

The silence in the first instance is surprising. With the U.S., European and Japanese economies — which have also been India’s traditional export markets — still struggling to break out of a low-growth trap, it is imperative for India to create a beach-head in newer markets for its goods, services and investments. Post 2008, India was forced to look to Africa and Latin America to maintain export buoyancy. But, both continents together account for a paltry 15% of India’s total exports and there is nothing strategic in this Budget that indicates a desire to achieve higher numbers.

Modi’s foreign policy priorities have also included a renewed thrust on India’s immediate neighbourhood — countries in both the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Barring the announcement of a project development company to help facilitate Indian private sector investments in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV), the Budget is bereft of any meaningful strategy. For example, there is no mention of, or funding allocated to, linking India’s North East to ASEAN through an all-weather transport corridor, an issue that has been discussed and accepted. Even with CMLV, there is no clarity on the investment-absorbing capacity of the individual countries or the kind of sectors Indian companies can focus on [1].

The Budget’s commitment to economic diplomacy is also reflected in money kept aside for various ministries. Budget allocation for 2015-16 under the head “Technical & Economic Cooperation with Other Countries and Advances to Foreign Governments” in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) [2] is up by 25.88%. But when compared with the original budget estimate, the allocation is actually down by about 3.5%. Worse, the budgetary outlay for the Department of Commerce in the Ministry for Commerce and Industry (the bulk of which is earmarked for foreign trade and export promotion) for 2015-16 is lower than both the revised and budget estimates for 2014-15. [3]

Another missed opportunity is the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, a key instrument of India’s development diplomacy which is administered by MEA. Despite its popularity, it’s allocation at Rs 180 crore for 2015-16 is just 16% higher than the actual expenditure last year. 

An argument can be made that given the shrinking fiscal space for the Centre, and the pressure to kickstart growth impulses through public spending, little is left to spare for economic diplomacy. However, that logic is self-defeating because the gains to economy — both in terms of growth and revenue — from accelerated geo-economic strategies is well known.

What makes these lapses doubly alarming is the grim future scenario for India’s trade regime outlined in the Economic Survey, which was released by Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian only a day before the Budget announcement. [4]

The survey singles out three main challenges: the phenomenon of unbundled and geographically dispersed global value-added manufacturing chains into which India has integrated slowly, the imminent rise of two large trade blocs (Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe) which will cover half the world’s trade and China’s emergence as a major voice in trade negotiations. India, says Subramanian, has only two choices: measured integration (an euphemism for status quo) or ambitious integration, which will require India joining the TTP (currently a remote possibility). The flip sides to both options are that measured integration will leave Indian exports isolated, while joining the TTP will require substantial liberalisation which may be out of alignment with domestic level reforms.

As China did during its entry to the WTO in 2001, India can forcefully dovetail the domestic reforms agenda to an external priority. But the country’s competitive democratic politics and the presence of varied interest groups makes that task exceedingly difficult.

Gateway House has been advocating a greater impetus towards improving India’s relationships with neighbours in SAARC and ASEAN, through a strategy of Corridors of Development and Circles of Influence, as a means of achieving some geo-strategic primacy in the coming years. [5] [6] This Budget could have begun that journey.

But, to be fair, finance minister Arun Jaitley has introduced many measures to attract fresh investment into manufacturing and services. These moves may not be headline-grabbing, but are a nuts-and-bolts policy framework: they seek to improve the ground conditions for attracting investments, facilitate efficient use of financing, eliminate legal obstacles that inevitably lead to disputes and prolonged legal battles, simplify processes and stabilise the tax regime. There seems to be a realisation in the Budget, as well as in the Railway Budget of February 26, that investors — whether domestic or foreign — are unlikely to part with their money unless the ground conditions are improved substantially.

The specific measures introduced by Jaitley – heeding the advice of the Economic Survey – include eliminating distinctions between different categories of foreign investors, one-source clearance for regulatory approvals, easier dispute settlement mechanisms, broadening scope of investment vehicles for foreign capital, providing tax clarity and stability. [7]

Hopefully, the oversight in providing the Budget with a strategic edge through geo-economics will be corrected in the quinquennial Trade Policy 2014-2019, which is already delayed and is likely to be announced soon by Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.

REFERENCES:

[1] Mathur, Akshay; Policy Catalyst: Seven Sisters’ Corridor; 30 May, 2014; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/policy-catalyst-seven-sisters-corridor/

[2] Notes of Demands for Grants 2015-16; Demand No 33, Ministry of External Affairs; Expenditure Budget, Vol II; http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/eb/sbe33.pdf

[3] Notes for Demands for Grants 2015-16; Demand No 12, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Expenditure Budget Vol II; http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/eb/sbe12.pdf

[4] Economic Survey 2014-15; Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India; February 27, 2015; http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2014-15/echapvol1-01.pdf (Page 37)

[5] Kripalani, Manjeet; Circles & Corridors of Economic Diplomacy; 18 April 2014; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/circles-corridors-of-economic-diplomacy/

[6] Gateway House Fellows; India’s foreign policy priorities 2015; 1 January 2015; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-foreign-policy-priorities-2015/

[7] Jaitley, Arun; Minister of Finance, Government of india; Speech to Parliament while presenting Budget 2015-16; 28 February 2015;http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/bs/bs.pdf


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Reprinted with permission from Gateway House: http://www.gatewayhouse.in/budget-2015-no-heed-to-economic-diplomacy/

and

Quartz India: http://qz.com/354516/another-area-where-modis-budget-disappointed-economic-diplomacy/