Showing posts with label ITEC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ITEC. Show all posts

Wednesday, 26 July 2017

India-Africa Ties: Economics and Multilateralism

If India is serious about its Africa initiative, a lot will depend on how it marshals its banking and financial sector there


The Leaders’ Declaration from G20 this year comes with an added annexure. It is called the G20 Africa Partnership, included at the insistence of Germany, which has the G20 presidency for 2017 and is at liberty to set the multilateral grouping’s agenda for the year. The annexure states its purpose: “The Partnership intends to support related initiatives of the G20 and facilitate investment compacts between interested African countries, international organisations and interested partners to support private investment, sustainable infrastructure and employment in African countries.”

Germany, as well as the European Union, have an abiding interest in Africa. The unrelenting waves of migration from North African shores (often leading to loss of lives while crossing the tempestuous Mediterranean Sea) and Europe’s volatile immigration politics are likely to have prompted Germany to rally the international community around Africa’s plight. Hence the partnership document focuses, among other things, on creating sustainable employment opportunities so that African youth do not risk lives in search of livelihood elsewhere.

Ironically, the G20 club includes only one African nation, South Africa. The Partnership document has its fair share of detractors, especially within African nations, and suspicions about its overwhelming reliance on private sector investment.

It also holds out three lessons for India.

The first relates to deeply embedded historical attitudes towards Africa. These rose to the surface again, perhaps unwittingly, while French President Emmanuel Macron was addressing a G20 press conference in Hamburg. Answering a question on why there was no Marshall Plan for Africa, Macron is believed to have said Africa had a different set of problems, which included “civilizational” problems. Some of the unique problems cited by Macron included failed states, complex democratic transitions and African women giving birth to seven-eight children. This predictably triggered a maelstrom of protests and diverted attention to Africa’s colonial past and France’s role in it. Macron’s statement was also viewed as reflecting Europe’s smug (and enduring) belief of civilizational superiority. Macron almost buried the partnership even before it had an opportunity to take off.

India must take note of this public relations disaster. The impact of government’s intensive outreach programmes has often been blunted by violent displays of racism against African students and citizens living in Indian cities. It is indeed an odd occurrence for India, which boasts of a long and shared history with Africa—especially cultural, social and trade ties. If at all, there is a felt need to accelerate the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (Itec) programme which provides capacity building for officials from low- income countries.

The second lesson arises from the G20’s internal contradictions and the possible impact on India. The document has a section on strengthening the framework for investments and private finance in Africa, in which the G20 welcomes other partners and “…complementary measures by the forthcoming EU External Investment Plan, the Forum of China Africa Cooperation, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development as well as others”.

Herein lie the conflicts within the G20: China, Japan, Turkey and the US are all independently competing for a foothold in Africa, with each country aggressively courting nations and their heads of state. Germany and the European Union are joining the fray now. India also has its own India Africa Forum Summit, which has been re-energized and supplemented with state visits by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, then president Pranab Mukherjee, vice-president Hamid Ansari and other senior ministers.

Given the multiplicity of competing interests, it has to be seen whether different countries will be willing to subsume their Africa ambitions under an over-arching multilateral approach. India will need to watch this effort closely. If required, India could consider activating the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), its joint initiative with Japan, through the G20 compact. The AAGC, which places significant emphasis on both infrastructure investment and capacity building, aligns well with the G20’s Africa approach.

The third point relates to the implicit assumptions behind private sector investments—that they will automatically generate more trade. Unfortunately, intra-Africa trade accounts for only 14% of Africa’s total trade. It is true that poor infrastructure slows down intra-Africa trade traffic, and therefore higher investments in road and rail infrastructure will surely help. The problem lies elsewhere—the lack of a trade facilitation culture and customs capacity which hinders cargo movement. India and Itec can definitely help here.

More importantly, there are other opportunities for India. Data from the African Development Bank shows only 31% of Africa’s trade is backed by bank-intermediated trade finance. This is clearly an opportunity for Indian banks. India’s banking presence in Africa seems to have lost its relevance over time: The geographical footprint is built around traditional Indian diaspora habitats in east and south Africa, and operations are tailored around ethnic banking services. Late in entering Africa, Chinese banks have already acquired stakes in leading banks. If India is serious about its Africa initiative, a lot will depend on how it marshals its banking and financial sector there.

The above article was published in Mint newspaper on July 26, 2017, and can also be accessed here 

Thursday, 5 November 2015

India Resets Africa Strategy

Changes in how India plans to approach its relationship with Africa were evident at the recent India-Africa Forum Summit, including the wider representation of African countries, and Modi’s push to forge a united front with Africa at multilateral institutions on trade and other issues. But beyond these, gaps in the India-Africa alliance remain to be addressed.


Four changes or incipient trends were noteworthy at the third India-Africa Forum Summit last month. These spell out the contours of the engagement that India will pursue with the African continent, its constituent countries, and regional organisations, as well as the government’s desire for a course correction in the traditional trajectory of the India-Africa relationship.

In the first change, a departure from the approach of previous Indian governments, the October event dispensed with the practice of following the Banjul formula, under which only a few African countries participated in the summit [1]. This time, the government invited all 54 African countries to New Delhi, and among those who came were 40 heads of state. While the shift in policy could be ascribed to this government’s predilection for spectacular optics, it is also true that the multilateral summit gave India an opportunity to engage with each country—Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj held numerous bilateral discussions with individual leaders and representatives.

This extensive bilateral exercise is tied to a second new policy stance—Modi’s push to forge a united front with African nations for a common, but differentiated, negotiating framework in multilateral institutions. India’s previous desires to build such a platform had remained nebulous; the most long-standing of these relates to reforms in the United Nations Security Council. In his inaugural speech at the summit [2], Modi said: “…our global institutions reflect the circumstances of the century that we left behind, not the one we are in today…That is why India and Africa must speak in one voice for reforms of the United Nations, including its Security Council.”

Beyond this, PM Modi has sought African support on two other critical multilateral fronts — climate change negotiations and trade talks. For the first, Modi wants to create a club: “I also invite you to join an alliance of solar-rich countries that I have proposed to launch in Paris on November 30 at the time of the COP-21 meeting.” A combined front such as this will be necessary when negotiating with rich countries for resources to shift to clean energy technologies because, “the excess of [a] few cannot become the burden of many.”

Modi also wants to align African countries to India’s concerns with the global trading regime. This becomes important given the forthcoming World Trade Organisation (WTO) ministerial in Nairobi in December, where developing countries are likely to make a last-ditch effort to save the Doha Development Round. The threat comes from developed nations, specifically the U.S., which in October has signed the Trans Pacific Partnership with 11 other nations and is lobbying to bury the development round.

Modi said as much in his inaugural speech: “India and Africa seek also a global trading regime that serves our development goals and improves our trade prospects. We must ensure that the Doha Development Agenda of 2001 is not closed without achieving these fundamental objectives. We should also achieve a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security and special safeguard mechanism in agriculture for the developing countries.”

India’s desire to construct a common bargaining platform is probably driven by the embarrassment of July 2014, when it was isolated while blocking the Trade Facilitation Agreement at WTO’s General Council meeting. India’s other attempts to get developing countries on board—to provide Duty Free Tariff Preference (DTFP) to least developed countries on 98% of its tariff lines, including in services— have also produced mixed results, prompting the government to now fast-track the entire scheme.

These points of common and joint multilateral action have been re-emphasised in the India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation, which was released at the end of the October summit [3].

The third outcome is a public acknowledgement of the partial success in implementing India’s marquee development cooperation programmes—concessional lines of credit (LOCs), grants, and capacity building through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme as well as the Pan Africa E-Network—and the need to improve the current processes.

Modi announced enhanced allocations for the programme—$10 billion under concessional LOCs (double the $5 billion announced at the 2011 summit), $600 million of grants, and 50,000 scholarships in India—but also admitted, in a departure from convention, that, “There are times when we have not done as well as you have wanted us to. There have been occasions when we have not been as attentive as we should be. There are commitments we have not fulfilled as quickly as we should have.”

The problem with LOCs is well documented [4] including a widening gap between sanctions and disbursements. In a pre-summit media briefing [5] in New Delhi on October 17, Secretary (West) in the Ministry of External Affairs, Navtej Singh Sarna, gave an update on LOCs: of the $7.4 billion on offer so far, $6.8 billion has been approved and $3.5 billion disbursed. In effect, disbursals are only 51.47% of sanctions.

Both India and recipient African countries are responsible for the low disbursal rate. In India, a multi-tiered and multi-agency framework for sanctioning and disbursing these loans creates delays. Additionally, a non-transparent process engenders attendant distortions. Exim Bank, which finally disburses the loans, has complained to the Prime Minister’s Office about malpractices [6]. On the African side, capacity gaps in drawing up detailed project reports, essential for the Indian side to conduct a proper appraisal and assessment, cause enormous delays.

The Framework for Strategic Cooperation has promised to introduce a “regular formal monitoring mechanism” to review the implementation of, and progress in, areas of cooperation and identified projects.

The fourth change was the absence of an announcement of trade targets, a departure from the accepted practice at such forums. This was probably necessitated because India-Africa two-way trade has fallen short of the $90 billion 2015 target [7]. But such ambitious targets tend to overshadow otherwise admirable progress in trade relations. In fact, trade between India and Africa has been remarkable. According to government data [8], two-way trade touched $72 billion during 2014-15, which is a vast improvement over the $4.5 billion of 1996-97.

But beyond these four directional indicators, interlocutors still need to address some persistent gaps in the India-Africa alliance.

One, there is little data in the public domain about the development and progress of projects, especially those under the LOC umbrella or under other initiatives announced from time to time. For instance, there is no report card on the promise to help build 100 institutions that India made during the second India-Africa Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in 2011.

Two, with similar and competing summits being hosted by China, Japan, Turkey, and the U.S., India should work on upgrading the status of its India-Africa Summit by including sub-fora on labour representatives, think tanks, civil society, academia, and women’s rights groups, in addition to the existing India-Africa Business Forum.

References

[1] Chand, Manish, ‘India and Africa: Sharing interlinked dreams’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 28 January 2015, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?24742/India+and+Africa+Sharing+interlinked+dreams

[2] Modi, Narendra, ‘Inaugural Ceremony Speech’, speech delivered at the Third India-Africa Forum Summit, New Delhi, 29 October 2015, http://iafs.in/speeches-detail.php?speeches_id=276

[3] Third India-Africa Forum Summit, India-Africa Framework For Strategic Cooperation, 29 October 2015, http://pmindia.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/p2015102903.pdf

[4] Qadri, Asgar & Rajrishi Singhal, ‘Development and Diplomacy Through Lines of Credit: Achievements and Lessons Learnt’, ORF Occasional Paper 53, August 2014, Observer Research Foundation,http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/attachments/op_53_1411638542827.pdf

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Media Briefings, 17 October 2015,http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/25945

[6] Iyer, P V, ‘Exim Bank’s red flag: Why most Africa deals go to so few firms?‘, The Indian Express, 20 October 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/exim-banks-red-flag-why-most-africa-deals-go-to-so-few-firms/

[7] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Joint Statement of 2nd India-Africa Trade Ministers Meet (2012),http://commerce.nic.in/trade/Joint_Statement_2nd_India_Africa_Trade_17_03_2012.pdf

[8] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Export Import Data Bank,http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp


Courtesy: Gateway House

Monday, 2 March 2015

Budget 2015: No Heed to Economic Diplomacy

Finance minister Arun Jaitley’s 2015-16 Budget resonates only partially with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s arc of economic diplomacy; it lacks strategic intent that could invest India with some geo-strategic heft in the years to come


Soon after he was sworn in as Prime Minister, Narendra Modi invested India’s languishing economic diplomacy with a renewed energy. It was therefore widely expected that Budget-2015 would achieve strategic convergence with Modi’s vision of using economics to drive India’s foreign policy. But the Budget seems to have achieved that only partially.

Economic diplomacy has a two-pronged role in the Indian economy. One, to open up markets for Indian goods, services and investments, with special emphasis on widening and deepening India’s footprint in neighbouring countries and newer markets like Africa and Latin America. Two, Modi’s whirlwind foreign engagements in the first eight months of his premiership were also focused on attracting foreign inward investments — from governments as well as the private sector — to further invigorate his “Make In India” programme.

On the first count, the Budget is conspicuously silent. It is on the second that the Budget holds out some hope.

The silence in the first instance is surprising. With the U.S., European and Japanese economies — which have also been India’s traditional export markets — still struggling to break out of a low-growth trap, it is imperative for India to create a beach-head in newer markets for its goods, services and investments. Post 2008, India was forced to look to Africa and Latin America to maintain export buoyancy. But, both continents together account for a paltry 15% of India’s total exports and there is nothing strategic in this Budget that indicates a desire to achieve higher numbers.

Modi’s foreign policy priorities have also included a renewed thrust on India’s immediate neighbourhood — countries in both the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Barring the announcement of a project development company to help facilitate Indian private sector investments in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV), the Budget is bereft of any meaningful strategy. For example, there is no mention of, or funding allocated to, linking India’s North East to ASEAN through an all-weather transport corridor, an issue that has been discussed and accepted. Even with CMLV, there is no clarity on the investment-absorbing capacity of the individual countries or the kind of sectors Indian companies can focus on [1].

The Budget’s commitment to economic diplomacy is also reflected in money kept aside for various ministries. Budget allocation for 2015-16 under the head “Technical & Economic Cooperation with Other Countries and Advances to Foreign Governments” in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) [2] is up by 25.88%. But when compared with the original budget estimate, the allocation is actually down by about 3.5%. Worse, the budgetary outlay for the Department of Commerce in the Ministry for Commerce and Industry (the bulk of which is earmarked for foreign trade and export promotion) for 2015-16 is lower than both the revised and budget estimates for 2014-15. [3]

Another missed opportunity is the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, a key instrument of India’s development diplomacy which is administered by MEA. Despite its popularity, it’s allocation at Rs 180 crore for 2015-16 is just 16% higher than the actual expenditure last year. 

An argument can be made that given the shrinking fiscal space for the Centre, and the pressure to kickstart growth impulses through public spending, little is left to spare for economic diplomacy. However, that logic is self-defeating because the gains to economy — both in terms of growth and revenue — from accelerated geo-economic strategies is well known.

What makes these lapses doubly alarming is the grim future scenario for India’s trade regime outlined in the Economic Survey, which was released by Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian only a day before the Budget announcement. [4]

The survey singles out three main challenges: the phenomenon of unbundled and geographically dispersed global value-added manufacturing chains into which India has integrated slowly, the imminent rise of two large trade blocs (Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe) which will cover half the world’s trade and China’s emergence as a major voice in trade negotiations. India, says Subramanian, has only two choices: measured integration (an euphemism for status quo) or ambitious integration, which will require India joining the TTP (currently a remote possibility). The flip sides to both options are that measured integration will leave Indian exports isolated, while joining the TTP will require substantial liberalisation which may be out of alignment with domestic level reforms.

As China did during its entry to the WTO in 2001, India can forcefully dovetail the domestic reforms agenda to an external priority. But the country’s competitive democratic politics and the presence of varied interest groups makes that task exceedingly difficult.

Gateway House has been advocating a greater impetus towards improving India’s relationships with neighbours in SAARC and ASEAN, through a strategy of Corridors of Development and Circles of Influence, as a means of achieving some geo-strategic primacy in the coming years. [5] [6] This Budget could have begun that journey.

But, to be fair, finance minister Arun Jaitley has introduced many measures to attract fresh investment into manufacturing and services. These moves may not be headline-grabbing, but are a nuts-and-bolts policy framework: they seek to improve the ground conditions for attracting investments, facilitate efficient use of financing, eliminate legal obstacles that inevitably lead to disputes and prolonged legal battles, simplify processes and stabilise the tax regime. There seems to be a realisation in the Budget, as well as in the Railway Budget of February 26, that investors — whether domestic or foreign — are unlikely to part with their money unless the ground conditions are improved substantially.

The specific measures introduced by Jaitley – heeding the advice of the Economic Survey – include eliminating distinctions between different categories of foreign investors, one-source clearance for regulatory approvals, easier dispute settlement mechanisms, broadening scope of investment vehicles for foreign capital, providing tax clarity and stability. [7]

Hopefully, the oversight in providing the Budget with a strategic edge through geo-economics will be corrected in the quinquennial Trade Policy 2014-2019, which is already delayed and is likely to be announced soon by Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.

REFERENCES:

[1] Mathur, Akshay; Policy Catalyst: Seven Sisters’ Corridor; 30 May, 2014; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/policy-catalyst-seven-sisters-corridor/

[2] Notes of Demands for Grants 2015-16; Demand No 33, Ministry of External Affairs; Expenditure Budget, Vol II; http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/eb/sbe33.pdf

[3] Notes for Demands for Grants 2015-16; Demand No 12, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Expenditure Budget Vol II; http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/eb/sbe12.pdf

[4] Economic Survey 2014-15; Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India; February 27, 2015; http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2014-15/echapvol1-01.pdf (Page 37)

[5] Kripalani, Manjeet; Circles & Corridors of Economic Diplomacy; 18 April 2014; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/circles-corridors-of-economic-diplomacy/

[6] Gateway House Fellows; India’s foreign policy priorities 2015; 1 January 2015; Gateway House; http://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-foreign-policy-priorities-2015/

[7] Jaitley, Arun; Minister of Finance, Government of india; Speech to Parliament while presenting Budget 2015-16; 28 February 2015;http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2015-16/bs/bs.pdf


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Reprinted with permission from Gateway House: http://www.gatewayhouse.in/budget-2015-no-heed-to-economic-diplomacy/

and

Quartz India: http://qz.com/354516/another-area-where-modis-budget-disappointed-economic-diplomacy/