What’s In The Bag?

For all intents and purposes, the Budget is in the right direction. Except, it could use a plan to achieve its ambitious goals

From the moment finance minister Arun Jaitley began reading his career’s third Budget speech, all the way till the very end, the stock market’s bellwether index, the BSE Sensitive Index, oscillated wildly. Social media comments too reflected the mood in the bourses — swinging between complimentary and scathing, to downright snarky and fulsome praise. 

One tweet even claimed (without furnishing any proof) that though the Budget speech was read out by Jaitley, its key architect was Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Another, snidely claimed the Budget seemed to have UPA-III’s imprint, given its emphasis on rural and farm sectors. There were other similar tweets. While you can’t really expect a proper analysis in 140 characters, it’s true that the tenor and content of Budget 2016 has left experts confounded and desperate to find the one thread that ties up the whole package of measures.

Indeed, there are multiple strands to Budget 2016, each striving to provide a specific solution. The question is: do all these cohere to form a meaningful tapestry? Does it make sense? It might be worthwhile to examine some of the overarching themes in Budget 2016.

Let’s consider the first charge: Budget 2016 is a political document. To be fair, Jaitley had little choice. Economic policy-making cannot be conducted in a political vacuum. With key states (Assam, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu) going to polls this year, followed by Uttar Pradesh and Punjab next year, it might be naive to expect that Budget 2016 will be bereft of any political grandstanding. 

That might also explain this Budget’s exaggerated emphasis on playing Robin Hood: imposing a slew of additional taxes on the wealthy, under the heading “Additional resource mobilisation for agriculture, rural economy and clean environment”, without bothering to specify whether these taxes will indeed be sequestered for the specified objective, or even caring to explain what happened to taxes collected under similar heads over the years. Ironically, Jaitley has himself provided the counter-point: pensioners withdrawing life savings from pension funds will now have to pay tax on 60 per cent of the accumulated corpus, if it is not invested in an annuity. As a wag observed drily, Thomas Piketty’s whistle-stop tour through India has left economic administrators with fleeting notions of inequality.

Two other broad themes dominate Budget 2016: a stimulus package to spur rural consumption and enhanced outlay to speed up investment in infrastructure. As argued in these pages a few weeks ago (http://goo.gl/GvFnbP), Jaitley was faced with a binary choice: either ramp up public investment to derive economic growth, or stick to the fiscal straight-and-narrow. A spirited public debate ensued with growth adherents advocating a temporary slippage in fiscal deficit. Fiscal hardliners argued it would be foolhardy to relax vigil during these trying times of global turmoil; a downgrade by credit rating agencies would scupper even incipient growth impulses.

In the end, the minister has chosen both options. How he achieves both ends will have to be seen. While his public investment outlay is up 15.5 per cent over previous year’s estimates, he has also set aside large amounts for the rural and farm sectors. Jaitley stated capital expenditure on railways and roads will alone account for Rs 2,18,000 crore this year. Additional outlays have been announced for investment in power generation, ports and waterways. It is interesting to note that even in infrastructure investment, the emphasis is on the rural sector: investing in expanding the coverage of irrigation (to reduce Indian farmers’ vulnerability to fickle monsoons) and investing in rural roads and rural electrification. Connecting unconnected villages will help farmers get their produce to markets. 

In the midst of this enhanced spending, the FM has also promised to adhere to the fiscal deficit target: 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product. A lot will depend on the revenues he manages to raise — Rs 19,610 crore of additional tax revenue (some of it from soaking the rich) and a 25 per cent increase in non-tax revenues. One large chunk of non-tax revenues (Rs 98,995 crore, compared with last year’s Rs 56,034 crore) is expected to come from telecom spectrum auctions. The other source of non-tax revenue is a leap of faith: the government expects Rs 56,500 crore from disinvestments. In this fiscal year, the government managed only Rs 25,312 crore against a target of Rs 69,500 crore.

Undoubtedly, the agricultural sector needs additional resources: it is not only hobbled by numerous structural deficiencies but poor monsoons over the past two years have caused deep distress in the sector. The Budget wants to double farmer incomes by 2022, by facilitating easier access to markets for inputs and finished products, higher credit allocation and better infrastructure. But, the text lacks details of how this will be achieved; there is no mention of a roadmap.

A massive allotment of Rs 2.87 lakh crore — in the form of grant-in-aid — has been made to village panchayats and municipal bodies. Again, there is lack of clarity about the end-objective of this fund flow. Will it be used for local infrastructure? How will the money be spent — in one year or five years?

The FM’s intentions seem honourable and generally aimed in the right direction. The economy needs higher public investment in the absence of private sector capital expenditure; there are deep structural flaws in the farm and rural sector that need urgent corrective action; fiscal discipline is non-negotiable. What’s lacking is clarity, or the nuts and bolts of how the FM intends to achieve these objectives. There are some other unanswered questions in the Budget:

Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy Committee have now acquired a statutory basis. Details on the committee’s composition are absent. While it has been clarified that there will be equal representation from both the government and the central bank (with RBI governor getting the casting vote), it is not known whether the original plan of appointing a senior bureaucrat on the committee as an ex-officio member still exists. The bureaucrat’s status as an observer is to report to the ministry on the voting pattern of the committee members. I am sure you get the picture.

There is an overall increase in the incidence of cesses and surcharges. One example is the Krishi Kalyan Cess, which will levy an additional 0.5 per cent on all taxable services. When combined with a consumption upsurge, due to Pay Commission arrears and a fillip to rural demand, the after-effects are most likely to be felt on the price line. What happens to inflation targeting then?

PM Narendra Modi’s ambitious Make In India programme suffers from domestic industry’s negative propensity to invest. Industry, in turn, complains that bank credit is not forthcoming. Banks, on the other hand, carp that their ability to lend is seriously impaired by mounting bad loans. In short, banks need fresh capital to start the lending process once again. Against this background, Jaitley’s allocation of only Rs 25,000 crore towards bank recapitalisation is underwhelming. FM Jaitley also mentioned consolidation; is he proposing public sector bank mergers as a way of reducing the drain on the Central exchequer?

The fiscal deficit target for 2016-17 — 3.5 per cent of GDP — is premised on GDP growing at 11 per cent. Given the global headwinds, and exports contracting for 14 months consecutively, slippage in the 11 per cent target will not be very surprising. Hopefully, the government’s resource transfers will keep the growth trajectory along expected lines.

A lot of Jaitley’s wishes are riding on revenue estimates delivering. He collected an additional Rs 54,334 crore of indirect taxes over the budgeted estimate during 2015-16 by increasing taxes on petro products, at a time when oil prices were crashing globally. Gross tax revenues are expected to grow by 11.73 per cent during 2016-17, at the same rate as India’s GDP. He is expecting tax on luxury consumption and a plethora of cesses and surcharges to fill the gap. It might be a bit of a tall ask.

There are too many imponderables in this well-intentioned Budget. Hopefully, some clarity will emerge in the coming weeks.

This article was published as cover story in Businessworld magazine (issue dated 'March 21, 2016) as part of the publication's special Budget package, titled 'Budget 2016 Split Verdict'.

The story can be found here.

Busting Myths Around Raghuram Rajan's RBI

There is no definitive proof that lower interest rates will lead unquestionably to higher economic growth.

The revised Indian Financial Code, put in the public domain by Finance Ministry, has divided economists, observers and experts into two distinct, sharply-delineated camps. On one side are those who are desperate to clip the Reserve Bank governor’s wings, and on the other are those who want his unspoken, uncovenanted autonomy to remain untouched, uncompromised. 

In the midst of this brouhaha, discussions about reforming the central bank’s governance framework has fallen through the cracks. While the debate about reducing the Governor’s powers rages endlessly, there is little attention being paid to what happens even after the change is effected. The Governor will still be answerable only to Finance Minister, and not to Parliament or a select committee of Parliament, as is the practice in many countries and as it should be in India too. It is surprising that this aspect of central bank reforms has failed to merit any discussion.

The revised code, among other things, has suggested that monetary policy, the exclusive preserve of central banks all over the world, should be decided by a monetary policy committee. Today, the final decision vests with the governor who, after consulting multiple bodies and committees, then has the sole discretionary power to take any monetary action. It is the composition of this recommended committee that has got people worked up. According to the revised code, the committee should have the RBI governor in the chair, two more RBI employees and four “persons appointed by the Central Governor”. Moreover, each member will have one vote and decisions will be taken on the basis of majority vote. 

With four votes, the government’s nominees immediately constitute a majority. Even more sinister is Article 257 in the code, which enjoins the Central government to nominate one representative to the meeting. This representative will not have a vote but will participate in the committee’s deliberations and will read out a statement from the government at the meeting. The import of this is not lost: with a representative watching the proceedings and delivering the central government’s message at the meeting, will any government nominee dare go against New Delhi’s wishes?

Arguments have been made that, in a democracy, the executive should have some say over a critical economic function like monetary policy. There is a basic flaw with this argument; separation of powers is a fundamental tenet of democracy, especially where the government’s actions can have an abiding impact on people’s lives. The inflationary stickiness arising from the 2008-09 stimulus programme is still haunting the Indian economy. Unlike the thick, Constitutional boundary separating the legislature from the judiciary, the line segregating the executive and the central bank is thin and rooted more in convention and common economic sense. 

It has become fashionable for economists of a certain orientation to demand reduced powers for the central bank governor. There are a couple of problems with that. First, under the new contract signed between RBI and the government, RBI is responsible for ensuring that consumer inflation remains within a pre-determined band. If the Governor ’s powers to use monetary tools to achieve that objective are taken away, then it somehow nullifies the inflation contract.

Second, the Indian economy has always been marked by fiscal dominance, which has been cogently explained by Niranjan Rajadhyaksha (http://goo.gl/3uwpz4) in his column for newspaper Mint. In simple words, monetary policy in India has always followed fiscal policy. The government’s fiscal policy, resulting in fiscal deficits, has forced the central bank to fashion monetary policy with the objective of tackling the after-effects of fiscal excesses. The RBI has worked hard over the past 25 years to minimise the deleterious impact of government’s profligacy on monetary policy. The government, in seeking to control both fiscal and monetary policies now, will negate all that has been achieved in stabilising the economy.

At the heart of the demand to shift the reins of monetary policy is a popular myth: reducing interest rates will automatically stimulate economic growth. Like all myths, especially those relating to flying machines of antiquity, there is no definitive scientific — or statistical — proof that lower interest rates will lead unquestionably to higher economic growth. Interestingly, another prevalent myth about the Indian economy being “decoupled” from the global economy evaporated quite rapidly after 2009. 

Many economists and industry lobbies have been incensed by RBI’s refusal to lower interest rates. Former RBI governor D Subbarao raised interest rates 13 times in quick succession. It was hoped his successor, Raghuram Rajan, would be divorced from such “anti-growth” orthodoxies. And, even though he has lowered interest rates, the pace has not been found too satisfactory. 

Beyond myths, a softer interest rate regime definitely has some side benefits: lower interest rates will automatically reduce the debt servicing burden of many large corporates which have borrowed way beyond their digestive capacities. While the RBI has been critical about the mounting levels of sticky loans in bank books and the behavioural patterns displayed by corporate borrowers, the government believes the investment cycle — especially “Make In India” — will not revive unless this staggering debt mass is sorted out.

Finally, the revised code employs some rather curious appellations: for example, it keeps referring to the RBI governor as “chairperson”. For example, Article 256(2)(a) says the monetary policy committee will comprise “the Reserve Bank Chairperson as its chairperson”. Last time I checked, RBI had no chairperson. He doesn’t exist even in the RBI Act.

Courtesy Outlook magazine: http://goo.gl/V1IALu