Time To Go To FRDI Bill’s Roots

Controversy around the bail-in clause aside, FRDI Bill’s clauses 58 and 62(1) regarding governance of a firm declared critical are inherently conflicting

Much has been said and written about the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017. The FRDI Bill was scheduled for discussion in Parliament this winter session but will now have to yield to more immediate concerns such as the Gujarat election results and the Central Bureau of Investigation special court’s verdict on 2G spectrum allocation. In addition, the joint committee of both Houses is yet to submit its report on the bill.

Public discussions on the FRDI Bill have focused on the formation of a resolution corporation and its bail-in powers in the event of a financial company going bust. The said corporation will monitor financial services companies, in coordination with regulators, and resolve them in case of failure. Bail-in implies using the company’s various existing liabilities—different debt categories or deposits not covered by deposit insurance (all deposits over Rs1 lakh)—to resolve impending failure. This is different from bailout, which implies external help, such as government using taxpayer money.

There may be some merit in constructing a resolution regime, given the financial system’s broader linkages. But there are other equally larger issues that also need highlighting, especially because they explain how we got here.

First, there is a need to discuss the relevance of an imported idea, a palliative designed for a different disease in a different body. Soul-searching after the 2008 financial crisis and its broader systemic impact through economic linkages led to the idea of a resolution corporation. It was felt necessary to design shock absorbers to insulate the economy and other financial sector institutions in the event of one single organization going bust, à la Lehman Brothers. The idea was discussed in various global governance institutions and rules were framed.

Some of the global credit rating agencies have been following up assiduously on the progress of implementation. Eyebrows are raised at jurisdictions, especially emerging economies, continuing to defer a resolution regime or designing a custom-built framework suited to their economy. In the meantime, the US, the epicentre of the crisis—which used taxpayer money to bail out all banks, including ensuring hefty bonus payouts to bankers—continues to enjoy the highest credit rating. Irony has, of course, been missing from the global credit rating lexicon.

In India, the idea of a resolution corporation was advocated in 2013 by the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission. This was followed up in 2014 with a Reserve Bank of India (RBI) working group report on crafting a resolution regime for financial institutions. Finally, in 2016, a Union finance ministry committee submitted a draft code on the resolution of financial firms.

Speaking in Parliament on 21 December, Union finance minister Arun Jaitley defended the FRDI Bill, claimed that depositors’ money in public sector banks would be protected and said that the bill was the outcome of a commitment made by the previous government to G20. Jaitley is right. The resolution framework was part of the G20 leadership’s final declaration at the 2011 Cannes summit. Ironically, there’s also a segment in the same communique that’s titled ‘Avoiding Protectionism and Reinforcing the Multilateral Trading System’; see where that’s got us.

This goes to the heart of the issue. The Indian government’s willingness to accept a cut-and-paste formula is curious, coming as it does on the back of similar decisions in the past which seemed alien to the peculiar complexion of India’s financial services—salary cap for financial sector chief executive officers and tightening regulation of “shadow banks”, leading to a squeeze on non-banking financial corporations which provide a unique last-mile solution to the Indian banking system, among others. In a system where banks (with an overwhelming public sector presence) dominate the financial system and are extensively regulated by RBI, there should be some discussion about whether importing regulatory frameworks, in universum, makes sense. More pertinently, whether the bail-in provisions recommended in the Financial Stability Board’s October 2014 guidelines are applicable to India.

By the way, all those fond of citing Singapore’s examples of good governance should look at the city-state’s proposed resolution regime, which excludes all deposits and senior debt from bail-in.

Secondly, there’s the issue of democracy and fundamental rights. In its current form, the FRDI Bill disallows the proposed corporation’s resolution process from being challenged in courts. This might be necessary to avoid undue delays in the resolution process and to avoid failure of wobbly financial companies. But it’s also like a slippery slope: the overwhelming presence of government representatives on the corporation’s board (including regulators’ representatives) can convert the corporation into a blunt tool of vengeful political action. It also disregards the RBI working group’s recommendation that a grievance mechanism be built into the process.

The larger, moral question is: Why does the FRDI Bill have to start off by being ham-fisted and draconian? Add poor drafting to that list; think tank PRS Legislative Research demonstrates how clauses 58 and 62(1) regarding governance of a firm declared critical are inherently conflicting. There are other similarly inconsistent clauses.

Finally, there’s the spectre of new regulators chipping away at the powers of old regulators, such as RBI. It raises the question: Does it really remedy anything?

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Sports And The Ease of Doing Business

There is no arguing that sports and sporting events should be made more inclusive

A recent statement by Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Union minister of state for youth affairs and sports, has rattled many private television broadcasters operating in India. Delivering the keynote address at the Confederation of Indian Industry’s (CII’s) Big Picture Summit, he said that media has an important role in taking sports to each and every home in India.

The minister’s intentions are honourable and desirable. But when combined with recent reports in this newspaper and elsewhere that the sports ministry is working with the ministry of information and broadcasting to declare cricket’s Indian Premier League (IPL) a tournament of “national importance”, it has multiple implications. This column usually eschews discussions on policy issues which are works-in-progress, but the multiple consequences of such a policy move are compelling enough to merit a moment of pause.

At the moment, the minister is only thinking aloud. But if the decision does come through, it will require a private sector network that won exclusive media rights to this tournament in an open auction conducted by the Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) to share its live feed of the event with national broadcaster Doordarshan under the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007.

Section 3(1) of the Act states: “No content rights owner or holder and no television or radio broadcasting service provider shall carry a live television broadcast on any cable or Direct-to-Home network or radio commentary broadcast in India of sporting events of national importance, unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal, without its advertisements, with Prasar Bharati to enable them to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and Direct-to-Home networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be specified.” Section 3(2)(1) of the Act also requires the “contents rights owner” (private broadcaster) to share 25% of advertising revenue with Prasar Bharati.

Apart from the relevance and applicability of the Act to IPL, whether the IPL can be termed an event of national importance or whether the statements were meant to influence the Gujarat state election, two critical issues stand out.

One, any possible ex-post intervention by the two ministries will go against the grain of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strenuous efforts to improve the ease of doing business in India. The private broadcaster won the rights to broadcast IPL matches via television, digital media, Indian and overseas media for five years on payment of Rs16,347.5 crore. This winning bid was probably calculated on the basis of certain metrics and revenue projections. But, if the two ministries follow through on their plans, it is likely to send all calculations awry. The issue once again raises the spectre of retrospective action, something that makes it vulnerable to international arbitration and investor anathema.

There is no arguing that sports and sporting events should be made more inclusive. Unlike many other developed countries where access to sports—including tennis or golf—is getting increasingly democratized, sports access in India remains largely sequestered behind elite walls. Even popular sports like football and hockey remain out of reach for a vast section of India’s population. Therefore, the ministry’s attempts to foster a deeper sporting culture and expand sports infrastructure is quite commendable.

However, as a policy imperative, this should have been included as part of the auction’s terms and conditions and not articulated as an afterthought. Bidders would have then structured offers differently, factoring in the changed dynamics and sharing of advertising revenue. Inclusion of the national network would definitely bring more eyes to the event, which would justify the sharing of advertising revenue. The contra argument is that with additional access points now available, it would reduce traffic to the original broadcaster, thereby having an impact on the overall revenue.

That brings us to the second point.

According the IPL the proposed special status raises multiple questions: What trigger points are necessary to declare a tournament of national importance? Can any minister, ministry or government department declare anything nationally important?

What adds to the confusion is whether the ministry of sports and youth affairs has any category listed as “nationally important”. The ministry currently has four categories created to determine eligibility for Central assistance: high priority, priority, general and other. The ministry documents: “In the ‘High Priority’ category, the sports played in the Olympic Games and in which India has won medals in last conducted Asian Games as well as Commonwealth Games or in which India has good chance of winning medals in Olympics have been included.” There are nine high priority sports and cricket is not one of them—athletics, archery, badminton, boxing, hockey, shooting, tennis, weightlifting and wrestling.

The Constitution’s seventh schedule puts sports in List II, or areas where states have jurisdiction. The ministry has been trying to include it in the Concurrent List; till that happens, it is questionable whether any declarations can be made. To be fair, the ministers have not yet got around to acting on their thoughts. But thinking aloud or even vocalizing arbitrary government intervention can send mixed signals to potential investors.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here