NPAs: The New Wedge in Centre-State Relations

NPAs are expected to acquire a two-tier, federal character with enormous implications for Centre-state relations

There was jubilation in stock markets recently after finance minister Arun Jaitley hinted at a scheme to sort out the messy tangle of bad loans in the banking sector. The equity market’s optimism beggars belief because NPAs—or non-performing assets, as bad loans are called technically—have remained impervious to an alphabet soup of previously attempted schemes. And now, NPAs are expected to acquire a two-tier, federal character with enormous implications for Centre-state relations.

In the post-1991 era, multiple schemes have been conceived and launched to tackle the menace of NPAs: DRTs (debt recovery tribunals, as suggested by Narasimham Committee-I and then subsequently amended in 2012), CDR (corporate debt restructuring), SARFAESI Act (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest), CRILC and JLF (Central Repository of Information on Large Credits and Joint Lenders’ Forum), 5/25 scheme, ARC restructuring (asset reconstruction companies, formed as a consequence of DRTs), SDR (strategic debt restructuring), AQR (asset quality review), S4A (scheme for sustainable structuring of stressed assets) and finally the IBC (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code).

There are multiple reasons for many of these schemes failing, which includes an inadequate legal framework for pursuing resolution; however, the one reason that remains unchanged from pre-reforms period is final policy design always providing corporate borrowers enough protection so that they can reprise the same act all over again. And while public attention has focused on Vijay Mallya—deservedly of course—there are other larger industrial groups which are habitual offenders but manage the system adroitly. Former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor Raghuram Rajan was compelled to state: “…it is extremely important that banks do not use the new flexible schemes for promoters who habitually misuse the system (everyone knows who these are) or for fraudsters.”

This raises issues of “moral hazard”; in the Indian context, moral hazard has taken the form of corporates or public sector banks undertaking increasingly riskier behaviour because they know the government is underwriting that risk or bearing the cost of that risk. Post the 2008 financial crisis, moral hazard has acquired some flexibility globally: it has become acceptable to bail out institutions if government feels such failure can lead to widespread systemic risk.

This may have inspired finance ministry’s chief economic advisor Arvind Subramanian to blithely suggest that government should perhaps bail out large corporate borrowers because that is how “capitalism works”. He feels only write-offs can sort out the “mountain of debt” sitting on bank books, or settle the twin-balance sheet problem (over-leveraged companies and NPA burdened banks). 

Interestingly, Subramanian has also contributed to the NPA soup cauldron: the annual economic survey recommends the creation of PARA, or Public Sector Asset Rehabilitation Agency. Not to be left behind, even RBI’s recently appointed deputy governor Viral Acharya has gamely added his two-bit: PAMC (Private Asset Management Company) and NAMC (National Asset Management Company).

So, while attempts are being made to untangle the knotted skein of corporate bad loans, albeit through an ever-growing thicket of acronyms, Jaitley has at the same time flatly turned down requests for farm loan waivers. He has received wide support. State Bank of India chairman Arundhati Bhattacharya has warned that fulfilling such pre-election promises might lead to dilution of credit discipline: borrowers might tend to defer repayment till the next elections in the hope of loan waivers. This newspaper also recently pointed out that the Indian agricultural sector needs long-term structural investments, not short-term exchequer-funded loan waivers. There is merit in each of these arguments.

But, here’s a catch: the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party also promised farm loan waivers in its Uttar Pradesh assembly election manifesto. Having won the elections and faced with the prospect of fulfilling that promise now, Jaitley has used an escape hatch to wriggle out of the commitments. Answering the debate on Finance Bill in Rajya Sabha, he has asked individual states to foot the bill for farm loan waivers. He has effectively created a two-tier, federal, moral hazard framework: Centre’s responsibility to bail out large corporates and states get to write off farm loans.

This further complicates attempts at creating a long-term, sustainable set of solutions for controlling and resolving the financial system’s NPAs. It also adds new headaches to the already vexed Centre-state relations. Competitive waiver promises have already weakened the fragile balance sheets of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. 

It also raises issues of discrimination. If the Centre wants to bail out some 30-40 large corporate borrowers on the pretext that their debt misery was the outcome of external shocks, does not the same logic or argument apply to farm loans, especially since many states have been victims of droughts, inadequate monsoons and crop failures? There is no doubt the NPA mess needs to be resolved urgently to kick-start investments and the growth process. But then, that solutions framework cannot be built on the foundation of discrimination and selective relief.

The above article was published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

The Budget Sidesteps Geostrategic Risks

Arun Jaitley’s budget seems to contain very little—by way of either allocations or strategic intent—to mitigate risks that endanger the Indian economy

Both the budget document and the Economic Survey have painstakingly detailed risks that endanger the Indian economy and can disrupt growth and employment impulses. Yet, the budget seems to contain very little—by way of either allocations or strategic intent—to mitigate these risks. The focus seems to be on surmounting immediate electoral challenges and neutralizing near-term policy distortions like demonetization.

Both Union finance minister Arun Jaitley and his chief economic adviser Arvind Subramanian see major risks emanating from the external sector. Jaitley’s budget lists multiple Fed rate hikes likely in 2017, commodity price uncertainty (especially crude prices) and “…signs of increasing retreat from globalization of goods, services and people, as pressures for protectionism are building up”. The Economic Survey also underlines the last two risks.

Given these clear and visible risks, it would be fair to expect defensive action, especially in areas of India’s strengths. The budget small print belies that belief.

Start with this year’s Economic Survey, which identifies clothes and shoes as ideal candidates for low-skill, high-employment manufacturing potential and for occupying crucial trade space being vacated by China. The survey also finds India has competitive advantage in these two items despite myriad challenges—such as domestic labour laws and tax structure, or the duty preferences enjoyed by competing countries in key buyer markets.

Given the Survey’s clear strategic direction, check out allocations for the commerce and industry ministry under the expenditure budget. Jaitley and his team have allocated only Rs0.01 crore to the Footwear Design and Development Institute, compared with Rs109.99 crore in 2015-16 and Rs25 crore in 2016-17. The institute provides skilled human resources and technology development to the leather and footwear industry. The Indian leather development programme (ILDP) gets a higher allotment of Rs500 crore, compared with Rs235 crore in 2015-16 and Rs400 crore in 2016-17. But then the ILDP focuses on improving the raw material base for leather units and the Survey actually shows non-leather footwear has achieved higher exports than leather footwear.

This is not the only mismatched allocation in the commerce ministry. There’s a token entry of Rs0.50 crore against the project development fund, which the ministry created with the Exim Bank to promote Indian private sector investments in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (commonly referred as CLMV nations) as part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Act East” policy. The creation of the fund was announced by Jaitley in his second budget in February 2015. There are, of course, no follow-up remarks in subsequent budgets.

The budget documents are littered with such examples. The geo-economic strategy, drawing from Modi’s repurposed foreign policy, betrays an excessive strategic reliance on select developed countries which could be a risk. The readout from the White House after US President Donald Trump’s brief telephone conversation with Modi reiterates that the US “…considers India a true friend and partner in addressing challenges around the world.” While these “challenges” remain undefined, Trump’s recent trade policy announcements now renders this alliance vulnerable. While it might be too early to declare doomsday, India needs a hedging strategy which includes exploring alternative markets.

And, yet, the budget sidesteps this obvious alternative. Take the example of Chabahar port in Iran, to which India has attached great geostrategic significance. The port offers India a land bridge to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets that bypasses Pakistan, and can become an alternative route to north Europe via Russia. Unfortunately, India continues to drag its feet on Chabahar, even though India and Iran started discussing it in 1997 and signed the first agreement in 2003 as part of the Delhi Declaration. This was further consolidated through a Trilateral Transit and Transport Corridor agreement signed during Modi’s visit to Iran in 2016.

Chabahar port has been allotted only Rs150 crore under the ministry of external affairs, compared with Rs100 crore in 2016-17. One could argue that since the project is being executed by special purpose vehicle Indian Ports Global Pvt. Ltd, a joint venture between Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) and Kandla Trust, it might make sense to identify capital allocation to these two ports. The two ports have been allotted Rs1,850.30 crore and Rs393.90 crore for 2017-18, against Rs562.38 crore and Rs130.18 crore, respectively, during 2016-17. But there’s a catch: Both amounts have been listed under the head “IEBR”, or internal and extra budgetary resources, which means the government will not contribute any money and the two ports will have to generate these amounts from profits, loans and equity. Importantly, both ports are also implementing significant expansion plans (the JNPT’s plans include two new container terminals, two dry ports in Wardha and Jalna, and a special economic zone, among other things) and it is moot how much funds they can spare for Chabahar.

Is India going deliberately slow on Chabahar, given the Trump administration’s recent statements and executive order against Iran? India’s on-now, off-now engagement with Iran may have pushed the country closer to China through a joint military cooperation agreement and possible One Belt, One Road connectivity. The budget lost an opportunity to make some critical course corrections.

The article originally appeared in Mint newspaper on February 8, 2017, and can also be read here