Showing posts with label Tata Steel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tata Steel. Show all posts

Wednesday, 2 November 2016

Anatomy of the unspoken word

Loss is inevitable when opacity obscures both government policy and price-sensitive corporate development




Ratan Tata (left) with Cyrus Mistry. File photo courtesy PTI.

This year’s Nobel for economics—on contract theory—continues the Sveriges Riksbank’s quest to reward investigations into information asymmetry, especially its role in contracts, markets and incentives. Theory suggests that asymmetry of information leads to imperfect markets, including adverse selection and moral hazard. While perfect markets are chimeras, restricted to theoretical constructs, communication and information flows play a definite role in reducing imperfections.

Two recent events highlight how lack of communication, or not saying the right word at the right time, can lead to sub-optimal consequences, especially for minority shareholders.

The first is the corporate putsch playing out on prime time. The sudden, unseemly ouster of Cyrus Mistry as Tata Sons chairman, and the subsequent two-way flow of accusations and assertions between him and his predecessor Ratan Tata, highlight how things can go terribly wrong when leaders do not communicate. In fact, the hazy chain of events suggests that breakdown in communications lines led to this abrupt, indecorous turn of events. As a result, the share prices of most listed Tata companies have suffered.

The first thing that strikes any observer is the perception gap between what Ratan Tata wanted from his successor and what Mistry, in turn, understood and delivered. While conversations between the two during the passing of the baton remain private, it is abundantly clear that either Mistry misunderstood his covenant or Ratan Tata was not explicit in describing the role. Ironically, and rather late in the day, both are indulging in excess communication, mostly through the media.

Consequently, there is soiled laundry on display. Leaving the allegations aside, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Ratan Tata’s and Mistry’s paths to corporate excellence diverged sharply and there were no attempts to make them meet. Mistry also expresses incredulity at the board “replacing” him for non-performance, especially after directors had lauded his performance. He also claims that while he was promised a “free hand”, some directors would leave in the middle of board meetings to seek Ratan Tata’s guidance.

The other side brushes these contentions aside; but it does maintain that Mistry has been on the Tata Sons board for a decade and was, therefore, party to some of the business decisions that he is now questioning.

All these point to a much larger, and grievous, communication gap. Neither Ratan Tata nor Mistry thought it fit to publicly discuss the controversial issues before they blew out of proportion. As a holding company of numerous listed companies, the Tata Sons board should have ensured adequate discussion and disclosure. For example, instead of lavishing Ratan Tata with public commendations, Mistry should have warned shareholders of the impending write-offs that he so direly predicts now.

The second incident of crossed wires is a direct outcome of the government’s multilateral trade strategy. A recent news story, citing unidentified people, said that the Indian negotiating team at the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) recent Oslo mini-ministerial had decided to oppose attempts by rich countries to introduce the promotion of global value chains (GVCs).

Indian negotiators fear that developed nations will sneak in issues like intellectual property rights, investment safeguards, competition laws under the garb of discussing GVCs. India, and a host of other developing countries, want WTO to first settle the pending Doha agenda before taking up new issues. Unfortunately, the Indian government’s ensuing communiqué about the meeting does not reveal whether GVCs came up for discussion at all. And even if they did, how the Indian side reacted.

Conversely, the whole episode might end up muddying the government’s policy stand on GVCs. India has been a proponent of GVCs, especially increasing the share of small- and medium-sized enterprises in GVCs. The government views GVCs as a device to increase domestic and foreign investment in manufacturing. The commerce ministry’s annual report for 2013-14 spells it out: “The business and trade segments of e-commerce and global value chains provide an opportunity to compete at par with other world economies and expanding our technology base.” But in the absence of proper communication, there is a lingering doubt over the government’s stand: Does it want GVCs or is it opposing their entry? Lack of clarity in economic policy hurts everybody because it affects investment decisions and stifles employment generation.

A similar lack of communication besmirched India’s reputation when WTO members met in July 2014 to vote on the trade facilitation agreement. India was the only country to oppose the deal and was subjected to global condemnation, despite having valid reasons for blocking the agreement. What made it doubly intriguing was the fact that India was principally on board with the idea and had already implemented many of the measures listed under the agreement. The problem: India did not communicate adequately with WTO fellow travellers or explain its stand lucidly. Western media, taking the cue from political leaders, labelled India a game-spoiler. Outcome: Global decision makers still look at India askance.

Both examples lead to one indisputable conclusion: Loss is inevitable when opacity obscures both government policy and price-sensitive corporate development.

This article originally appeared in Mint on November 2, 2016. It can also be read here.

Thursday, 7 April 2016

Going Global? Study Tata Steel First

All Indian companies planning to go global should closely follow the saga of Tata Steel’s UK plants; it’s a masterclass on how intimately business is intertwined with geopolitics and geoeconomics


An epochal event, that should resonate for every globalised Indian business, brought down the curtains on an eventful 2015-16. In the last fortnight of March, Tata Steel declared[1] that it will sell off or mothball its U.K. steel plants. The event contains a lesson for every Indian business aspiring to go global; it also has immense geo-economic and geo-political repercussions.

Tata Steel’s momentous decision is in keeping with the general trend of Indian companies selling off overseas assets to either repay debt or exit low-yielding assets. Tata Steel’s decision seems to be a combination of both. Here are some other examples of Indian companies selling overseas assets:

* Reliance Industries sold its Eagle Ford shale oil field in the U.S.A. for $1.07 billion in June 2015.
* In October 2015, Bharti Airtel sold telecom tower assets – close to 8,300 towers — in seven of the 13 countries from its African operations. The proceeds: $1.7 billion.
* Suzlon sold German subsidiary Senvion (earlier known as Repower) to private equity company Centerbridge Partners for Rs 7,200 crore in January 2015.
* GMR Group sold three overseas operations during 2013: in March it sold a 70% stake in GMR Energy (Singapore) Pte Ltd for $520 million; in December it offloaded its 40% stake in Istanbul airport and another airline services company f0r a combined $305 million.
* Avantha Group’s Crompton Greaves has been selling its overseas power equipment assets.
* Healthcare company Fortis sold five overseas healthcare assets between 2013 and 2015

This is just an indicative list but does underline India Inc’s troubled liaison with globalisation. Economic reforms and competitive pressures forced many Indian companies to expand operations overseas through acquisitions with either (or a combination) of three objectives in mind – to acquire competitive supply chains, to access consumer markets, to buy into developed technology and intellectual property. However, the fault was not in going global but seemingly, in the timing.

But it also begs the question: how did Indian companies end up borrowing so much that it would subsequently force them to jettison their cherished global desires?1And, how come they never saw the approaching storm, because most of the loans were contracted either just before the crisis or during the slowdown?

Tata Steel’s UK outing is an example that provides an answer. It acquired British company Corus in April 2007, subsequently renaming it Tata Steel Europe. Tata paid over $12 billion for the purchase, most of it debt. Around the same time, the sub-prime mortgage crisis had started undermining global markets, leading to the cataclysmic closure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent global financial crisis.

The economic slowdown and continuing weakness in European markets affected sales. What exacerbated matters were structural factors — global steel oversupply, increase in third-country exports into Europe, high manufacturing and environmental costs, continued weakness in domestic steel demand and a volatile currency.

Many other Indian companies with ambitions of acquiring a global footprint similarly borrowed heavily either in 2007 or, bizarrely, during 2011-12. A bloated appetite for foreign currency loans was fuelled by historically low interest rates in developed markets. There was also an element of hubris – a mistaken feeling that growth would continue unhindered, unaffected and untouched by global turmoil.

Unfortunately, this also reveals India Inc’s lack of strategic intent and a bewildering ignorance of geo-economic currents. The absence of an in-house risk-mitigating treasury process is exposed in numerous speeches by various Reserve Bank of India governors: most companies that borrowed overseas to finance acquisitions, left their foreign currency exposures unhedged. Consequently, the rupee’s depreciation since 2013 increased their loan-servicing burden.

Tata Steel’s woes, though, could have an additional set of triggers, which could include UK’s geo-political snuggling-up to China, or even the country’s vexed relationship with the European Union (EU).

China has been dumping cheaper steel in Europe after other large markets – including U.S.A. and India – increased tariff barriers. This has resulted in demands within Europe to increase import tariffs as well.

In a February 4, 2016 news release to disclose results for the quarter ending December 2015, Karl-Ulrich Köhler, MD & CEO of Tata Steel in Europe, stated: “Chinese steel shipments into Europe leapt more than 50% last year, while imports from Russia and South Korea jumped 25% and 30% respectively. The European steel association has identified that Chinese steel is being exported at prices below the cost of production…”[2]

In a separate statement, Roy Rickhuss, general secretary of the steelworkers’ trade union Community, said: “I would like to see evidence of the Prime Minister’s claims that they have increased procurement of British steel or tackled Chinese dumping of steel in Europe…The UK is one of the member states opposing the end of the lesser duty rule in Europe, which currently prevents higher tariffs being imposed.”[3]

But Europe is wary of jeopardising its relationship with China – it is the EU’s second-largest export market, and fourth-largest FDI destination.

The EU and the UK dithered on imposing higher import duties on steel because of apprehensions that it might render end-user industries uncompetitive. Higher tariffs present another predicament for the current Conservative government: weighing the cost-benefit of saving the 15,000 jobs at the Tata Steel works versus antagonising new-found friend China.

Tata Steel now involuntarily finds itself inserted into the Brexit campaign. Advocates of Britain’s exit (Brexit) from the EU are arguing that exiting the Union will allow the Cameron government to bail out the Tata Steel plants and save those 15,000 jobs. Currently, EU’s state-aid and procurement rules restrict state-sponsored lifelines to industry, which have been bolstered by two recent rulings[4].

A face-saving formula – which keeps Tata Steel and its workers, Britain, EU, and China happy — might still be in the works. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom[5] ’s speech at a recent trade conference provided some clues to such a compromise.

Whatever the fate of Tata Steel plants and jobs, there is a learning in this for Indian companies which are looking abroad: before investing in any jurisdiction, India Inc must do well its homework about a country’s potential geo-economic tripwires – specifically, its bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements – and geo-political risks. This will require corporate India to develop a new strategic temper and a broader perspective, one that thinks more like a multinational leader with global – not just Western – ambitions, rather than rely only on the template advice proffered by international bankers and management consultants.

References

[1] Press Release, BSE Limited, Review of European Portfolio of Tata Steel, 29 March 2016, <http://corporates.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/EB0CC117_DBF1_47E0_8753_5DEA119FE8B6_082546.pdf>

[2] News Release, TATA Steel, Tata Steel reports Consolidated Financial Results for the third quarter and nine-months ended December 31, 2015, 4 February 2016, <http://www.tatasteel.com/investors/pdf/Q3-FY15-16.pdf>

[3] News & Views, Community, Community responds to Prime Minister’s statement on steel,31 March 2016, <http://www.community-tu.org/community-responds-prime-ministers-statement-steel/>

[4] Other news, European Commission, Vestager announces EU State aid decisions: Belgium and Italy, 20 January 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/vestager-announces-eu-state-aid-decisions-belgium-and-italy_en.htm>

[5] Malmstrom, Cecilia, ‘Trade Defence and China: Taking a Careful Decision’, European Commission Trade defence Conference, 17 March 2016, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154363.pdf>


This feature was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can find the article here.