Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts

Wednesday, 9 August 2017

RBI’s Studied Silence Over External Vulnerabilities

Critics are questioning the wisdom of the RBI after a 25 basis point reduction in benchmark interest rates fell short of capital market expectations


The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) 25 basis point reduction in benchmark interest rates fell short of capital market expectations. They were expecting a deeper cut but the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) played safe, given uncertainty surrounding the future inflationary path. Critics are questioning the wisdom of the central bank and its MPC.

MPC members surely deserve to be cut some slack. But, in the general din over low food inflation, insufficient interest rate cuts and RBI’s unchanged neutral policy stance, the central bank’s policy statement omitted mention of a small crimp: a tsunami of portfolio flows, another possible source of inflationary pressures. The central bank’s studied silence about external vulnerabilities raises many questions.

This rush of foreign currency has forced RBI to take steps which have disappointed overseas debt markets and investors: for instance, rules have been tightened for issuing masala bonds through introduction of maturity floors and interest rate caps. This comes when masala bonds were gaining popularity with both issuers and investors. In another (though seemingly unrelated) circular, the RBI has sought to elongate the maturity profile of investments by foreign portfolio investors (FPI) in government bonds. Capital markets regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi), followed through with another circular, ordering a temporary stop to future masala bond issuances.

The RBI has probably sensed higher risk—in terms of both rates and exposures—in the opening of masala bond floodgates, especially after offshore arms of certain Indian companies raised foreign currency loans in overseas markets and then on-lent the proceeds to domestic entities as rupee bonds. This structure defeats the entire purpose of shielding Indian borrowers from exchange rate volatility since it provides original lenders with an indirect claim on domestic assets.

Sebi’s rationale is that FPI investments in corporate bonds have reached close to the limit of Rs244,323 crore. This ceiling includes all rupee-denominated bonds, offshore or on-shore. The regulator’s circular also states that masala bond investments can resume only after limit utilization falls below 92%.

RBI’s rear-guard action also probably stems from the combined effect of two other reports—its own report on India’s external debt and the annual External Sector Report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both sound circumspect about India’s rising short-term foreign debt levels. The IMF reports states: “Given that portfolio debt flows have been volatile and the exchange rate has been sensitive to these flows and changes in global risk aversion, attracting more stable sources of financing is needed to reduce vulnerabilities… Further initiatives on creating a more conducive business environment, particularly the implementation of long-standing labour market and power sector reforms, are necessary to attract greater FDI flows.”

FPI investments in equity and debt markets saw combined net inflows of Rs171,581 crore till July end. This is six times more than the Rs27,055 crore invested by FPIs during the same period of 2016. This surge had rupee appreciating by almost 5.8% between 2 January and 31 July.

Such large inflows put RBI’s absorption skills to the test. First, it has to intervene in the foreign exchange market to absorb foreign currency inflows so that portfolio investments do not push up the rupee-dollar rate beyond its sustainable and economic value. The resultant overhang of rupee liquidity then requires a second defensive action: the RBI has to mop up liquidity through a variety of instruments. For example, in the 11 working days between 17 July and 29 July, RBI absorbed Rs405,228 crore. Sterilization has its costs, especially when central banks sell high-yield domestic instruments while buying relatively low-yielding foreign currency assets. There are also fiscal implications.

The central bank’s woes do not end here: it needs to calibrate another two-step dance. The RBI’s remonetization exercise is still far from complete but it is unable to accomplish that at full tilt, given the wash of domestic liquidity. At the same time, it has to ensure that there is enough liquidity to make up for lost productivity during demonetization. Both will require precision and fine-tuning. Plus, it needs to ensure there’s just enough liquidity to keep yields soft.

There’s another dilemma. The FPI investment limit in corporate bonds was fixed when the exchange rate was below Rs50 to a dollar and common sense dictates a re-calculation of the limit. But the central bank is not doing that just yet, given that its hands are full trying to staunch current inflows.

Times like these are ripe for conspiracy theories. There are misgivings that RBI’s efforts could be an indirect attempt to ensure borrowers do not export the domestic bank credit market to offshore centres. While bank credit growth remains anaemic, Bloomberg data shows Indian companies raised $8.9 billion through overseas bond sales till July, 63% higher than the previous year. It is believed many companies took advantage of tightening spreads and used foreign currency bond sales to refinance domestic bank exposures, thereby intensifying balance of payments risks.

The MPC statement omits mention of external sector developments. Hopefully, the RBI will separately provide a more comprehensive communication that details the risks and the mitigation measures.

The article originally appeared in Mint newspaper on August 9, 2017, and can also be read here

Monday, 20 June 2016

The Legacy: Raghuram Rajan is leaving the battlefield just when he was getting the better of his rivals

India’s debonair central banker, Raghuram Rajan, leaves behind many broken hearts and disappointed souls. Chronicles of his legacy will list many achievements, but will also note that he left the battlefield just when he was getting the better of his rivals; what’s surprising is that the commander-in-chief agreed to his pre-mature withdrawal even though the general’s strategies could be seen bearing fruit.

Equally perplexing will be the choice of his replacement.

Both the government and Rajan personally have been advocates of an alternative global financial architecture. He has also been proposing for a while that it was time for a new Bretton Woods mechanism. And Rajan had taken the battle to the enemy camp. At the April 2016 spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Rajan observed how deeply multilateral financial institutions were in thrall of western economic orthodoxies. He even wryly remarked how ideas from emerging economies were dismissed as “crankiness.”

He was prescient about the trans-Atlantic financial crisis. He took on former US Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke when US domestic monetary policy spilled over into the global economy and led to severe volatility in emerging markets. He is unlikely to have fond memories of the period: he had to douse this particular fire soon after his appointment in Sept. 2013.

So, here is question number one: Will his successor have the same zeal about promoting an alternative global financial architecture that is sensitive to emerging economy needs and is not partisan about any particular economic ideology?

Rajan also quits before another crusade could be brought to its logical end. He’s been battening down the hatches that allowed a cosy nexus between large corporate borrowers, bankers, politicians, and bureaucrats, to bleed public sector banks through questionable debt write-offs. Rajan had taken a large broom to bank balance sheets and forced them to take drastic action against defaulters.

Many large—and over-stretched—corporate borrowers have been carping about Rajan’s reluctance to reduce interest rates, which, when lowered, would have certainly helped moderate their interest burden. These same corporates also turned into quack economists on the matter of interest rates: in their collective view, only lower interest rates could bring back high rates of economic growth. This view is oblivious to the fact that the low interest rates in the US, or negative rates in Europe and Japan, have failed to promote any economic growth.

Time for question number two: Will Rajan’s successor have the stomach (or benign sanction from the government) to continue with the clean-up act? Or to hold rates steady when required?

So, what does Rajan’s legacy look like? Apart from the well-documented success in fending off volatility from the US Fed’s tapering in 2013, his tenure will be remembered for three systemic changes he fostered.

One will be the differentiated banking landscape that he designed and left behind. As RBI governor, he grandfathered the emergence of a new breed of universal, small, and payments banks. He was in the process of adding two more categories—custodian banks and wholesale (or long-term) financing banks—to the mix. We will now have to wait and see if his successor has the same enthusiasm for a differentiated banking model.

These new categories come in addition to existing myriad forms of cooperative banks, regional rural banks, local area banks, public sector scheduled commercial banks, State Bank of India group of scheduled commercial banks, old-generation private sector banks, new-generation private sector banks, and foreign banks.

Restive signs mark the payments banks space—three companies which received in-principle approval to launch payments banks (Cholamandalam, Tech Mahindra, and Dilip Shanghvi of Sun Pharma) returned their licences stating that the project was not economically feasible. Undeniably, and in true RBI style, the initial architecture is anti-profit and has flaws in it.

The second marquee item is his strict action against non-performing assets (NPAs) that continue to impair bank balance-sheets. This was viewed as his struggle to end Indian-style crony capitalism: large volumes of loans remain unpaid every year and yet defaulting borrowers manage to get fresh loans unfailingly with some help from politicians, bureaucrats, and complicit bankers.

The staggering amount of NPAs is a direct drain on taxpayers, since loss to state-owned bank balance sheets must be compensated with fresh equity infusion by the largest shareholder—government— every year.

Finally, the outgoing governor will be remembered for installing a new monetary policy framework, which uses inflation-targeting as its driving philosophy. It also includes a monetary policy committee comprising three government representatives and three central bankers, with the RBI governor getting the casting vote. This new structure overhauls the old belief that the economy’s fiscal (the government) and monetary policy (central bank) sides should remain out of each other’s hair.

While the government has been uncomfortable with Rajan’s public comments about governance and broader political economy trends—saying that central bankers should not interfere with the fiscal side—it has not shown the same restraint when trying to influence monetary policy.

It will have to be seen how future central bankers and monetary historians view Rajan’s acquiescence to large government presence in monetary policy making.

The article first appeared in www.qz.com/india and can also be read here.

Wednesday, 7 October 2015

NDB: A Pivot To Financial Alternatives

The BRICS Bank wants to complement existing multilateral arrangements while simultaneously creating an alternative architecture; it can begin by tying up with existing Asian liquidity support systems and forging a non-dollar clearing system 

Introduction 

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 exposed numerous faultlines in the international monetary system and in the global financial architecture (GFA). In addition, globally trusted benchmarks, such as Libor and Brent, were found susceptible to manipulation and distortion. Also, the global financial system was subjected to unilateral geopolitical objectives, like the U.S.-imposed economic sanctions against Iran. 

Consequently, in 2008, the G20, an existing multilateral grouping, was transformed and upgraded—from an annual meeting of finance ministers and central bankers to a leaders’ summit—to handle the GFA’s infirmities[1]. However, the G20 has achieved only partial success, with no noticeable progress on either reducing global imbalances or on addressing the GFA’s weaknesses, as was promised in 2009. 

As a result, untrammelled portfolio capital flows from developed economies to emerging markets—considered dangerous, volatile, and unregulated—have now driven many emerging nations to seek regional initiatives. 

BRICS is such an initiative, though it is distinctive from other similar groupings—its member countries are not geographically contiguous. Another unique feature is the low intensity of trade and investment among each other, [2] even though economics was a primary motive for these countries forging a common platform. The other compulsion was to seek an alternative to the dominant GFA and the concomitant governance structure in various multilateral development banks. 

The formation of BRICS and its leaders’ intentions were initially met with scepticism. However, these leaders have delivered on some of their promises—BRICS nations formally launched the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) at the Fortaleza Summit in 2014, [3] fulfilling a long-held promise. 

The NDB and the CRA are delivery platforms for development finance and emergency liquidity support, respectively. Both are designed to provide an alternative to the multilateral governance orthodoxy prevalent at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. All BRICS leaders (as well as newly-appointed NDB president K.V. Kamath) have emphasised that the NDB does not purport to replace the existing multilateral institutions, but will complement them, while offering an alternative financing model for sustainable development. 

The first steps to intensify economic relations have already been taken. The NDB has signed, in Ufa, Russia, a memorandum of understanding with five national development banks [4] from each BRICS country; it also signed agreements, in Fortaleza, with five export credit guarantee companies. The agreements are expected to “…enhance trade and economic relations between member countries”. 

The individual pieces 

The agreement to set up NDB, signed by the five BRICS leaders, states the bank’s mission: “The Bank shall mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.” [5] 

This has three components: one, the NDB will finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects; two, the financing will be done in BRICS and “other emerging economies and developing countries;” three, the NDB will complement the efforts of existing multilateral institutions. 

Each of these components encapsulates BRICS’s philosophy and strategy. It is important to note that, apart from infrastructure projects, there is an emphasis on financing sustainable development—and on this front western financial institutions and civil society in emerging economies diverge widely in terms of approaches and ideologies. Perhaps the NDB will provide a different approach to financing sustainable development. 

The CRA agreement—expected to provide liquidity support to BRICS members during balance of payments crises, a service that even the IMF provides—echoes similar sentiments: “…this contingent reserve arrangement shall contribute to strengthening the global financial safety net and complement existing international monetary and financial arrangements.” [6] 

Interestingly, both agreements contain phrases that subscribe to furthering the global cooperation framework while simultaneously trying to create alternative arrangements. 

What are the potential new frameworks and how they can be strengthened further? 

First leg: a monetary union 

Challenging the governance framework will require creating an alternative to the existing international monetary system, including the reserve currency mechanism. BRICS summit communiques also mention this. The Durban Declaration of March 2013 states: “We support the reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broadbased international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome the discussion about the role of the SDR [special drawing rights] in the existing international monetary system including the composition of SDR's basket of currencies.” [7] 

It might be worth examining whether the concept of an Asian monetary union or a single Asian currency are options that can be revived. This currency, if it materialises, could rank alongside the dollar and euro as a globally significant unit, given the underlying trade volume. Many scholarly discussions have toyed with the idea of currency internationalisation and what it will mean for BRICS in general and for all emerging economies in particular. In reality, an Asian currency union is still some distance away, but some building blocks have already been put in place. 

There is, for example, a move to form an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which, according to the ASEAN’s website, will have the following characteristics: a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. [8] According to audit and consulting firm KPMG: “The AEC project could lead to an even more effective integration into the global value chains. And this will continue to make ASEAN a strategic economic region that is expected to exceed the global growth average for the foreseeable future.” [9] 

The AEC was a reaction to the 1997-98 financial crisis. The crisis also prompted some additional structural changes. ASEAN+3 [10] implemented a liquidity support mechanism, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) and, in the process of multilateralising the arrangement, it created the ASEAN+3 Macro-economic Research Office (AMRO). These two initiatives are discussed later in this paper. 

Two other initiatives were added as a fallout of 1997-98: the Asian Bond Markets initiative (ABMI), supported by the Asian Development Bank, which also now includes a Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF). The ABMI was born at a 2003 meeting of ASEAN+3 finance ministers, primarily to avoid the 1997-98 currency and maturity mismatches from short-term foreign currency borrowings. [11] The CGIF was established in November 2010 to provide credit guarantees for local currency denominated bonds issued by investment grade companies in ASEAN+3 countries. [12] 

The Asian crisis also prompted the Japanese government’s Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry [13] to moot an Asian currency union. Since then, much has been written and debated about the proposal, though little progress was made. 

The U.S. and Europe had opposed the idea when it was first proposed. Numerous other hurdles—such as the lack of an institutional framework (for example, an external independent central bank like the European Central Bank, which might require member countries to cede control of their monetary and fiscal powers)—have delayed implementation of the currency union. 

A political consensus is also missing. Plus, while the currency union model encompasses ASEAN+6 (ASEAN+3 along with India, Australia and New Zealand), all the other institutions or mechanisms—CMIM, AMRO, ABMI, CGIF, or even plans for AEC—are still stuck at ASEAN+3. Therefore, the integration of Asia’s economic community is still partial, and not representative of the region’s economic flows. 

Even if launched in the near future, it is unlikely that all BRICS members will be in a position to, or agree to, adopt a common Asian currency. There are three other choices: 

One, BRICS countries launch their own currency, which would be used exclusively by the five members. But this is not without its attendant problems. A common BRICS currency will also require the setting up of an institutional framework like the Asian currency union. This is unlikely to be favoured soon. In addition, the spectre of Eurozone’s current economic travails is likely to be a big deterrent. 

The second option, widely favoured, is to expand the scope of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and make it representative of the world’s changing trade and economic imperatives. But the IMF’s recent review to include the Chinese renminbi—in addition to the dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling—once again ended in status quo, with a decision postponed to September 2016. [14] Unless the IMF decides to review its eligibility criteria for including other currencies, the objective of reforming the SDR mechanism and using it as an alternative international reserve currency will remain elusive. 

The interim answer may, therefore, lie in trading and settling in local currencies. [15] ABMI and CGIF have already created the infrastructure for the launch, subscription, and trading of local currency bonds. The infrastructure for settlement of local currencies also exists, though it might need some resuscitating: the Asian Clearing Union (ACU), which saw diminished volumes after economic sanctions were imposed on Iran, could be the right vehicle. Some academics, such as monetary theorist Ashima Goyal, also favour the idea of reviving regional payments systems like the ACU, which can then provide a counterbalance to the dollar. [16] 

The NDB may explore the option of creating an infrastructure for settlement of local currency trading beyond the current ACU members, or provide a thought leadership role in expanding the ACU mechanism to a larger catchment area, even though its current mandate does not explicitly mention it. But there are clauses in the agreement that also implicitly allow the NDB to interact with other regional institutions. 

In any case, the NDB agreement empowers the institution to also lend in local currency: “The Bank in its operations may provide financing in the local currency of the country in which the operation takes place, provided that adequate policies are put in place to avoid significant currency mismatch.” [17] Combined with the Delhi Summit decision to start invoicing intra-BRICS trade in local currencies, there is a potential for dovetailing this effort with the work already done by the ACU. 

The NDB then should later explore methods of integrating its local currency settlement framework, bond issuance platform and credit guarantee programme with non-BRICS ASEAN+6, as well as with other similar platforms in Africa and South America, such as the South African Development Community (involving South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). 

This might help create some momentum in non-dollar and non-euro trade, which will lead to lower transaction costs. This is critical for increasing global trade and investment volumes. 

Second leg: strengthening the safety net 

The second leg of a future NDB-based governance structure involves the liquidity support mechanisms, CRA and CMIM. Both owe their birth to similar needs and analogous concerns raised by East Asian countries and BRICS nations. In sum, both are similar in intent and design. There is another similarity: an inability to sever the umbilical cord with the IMF. In that sense, the CRA continues with the ASEAN trend of using plurilateral monetary arrangements to complement, and not supplant, the IMF. 

Both the arrangements allow countries to borrow only a small percentage without entering into an arrangement with the IMF. [18] In CMIM and CRA, only 30% can be borrowed from the pool without reference to the IMF. The CMIM is believed to be working towards increasing this to 40%. Over time, this has to obviously grow further till the IMF-linked portion becomes insignificant. 

The reasons for the IMF linkage have not been explained. There are conjectures though: that a liquidity crisis in any country is likely to be triggered by structural problems and not speculative forces, which would then require structural adjustments that the IMF is best qualified to provide. Another view is that the CMIM does not have the capacity to differentiate between a liquidity and a solvency problem. [19] 

There is another probability: the CMIM as well as CRA not only lack the fundamental capability to assess structural flaws in an economy, but both might also be diffident about dictating a structural adjustment programme to another sovereign. The two arrangements are plurilateral groupings and lack the political or moral authority to impose conditions, especially after criticising the IMF for frequently undermining sovereignty. The IMF, on the other hand, is still seen as an independent multilateral organisation despite the lack of shareholding reforms in the institution. 

However, both CMIM and CRA also have an equal chance of failure given their inherent structural flaws. The CMIM has already faltered once—in the aftermath of the 2008 GFC —even though it has been in existence since 2000. South Korea approached the U.S. and Japan, instead of tapping the CMIM, for liquidity swaps post-2008. The problem was a proliferation of bilateral swap lines; that has now been replaced with a multilateral structure, under which all the different swap lines are governed by a single agreement. In cognisance, CRA has started off by pooling its funds. But the efficacy of both will be tested during the next global crisis; and, given the general unpredictability of financial upheavals, the two arrangements will have to be prepared for all eventualities. 

There is, thus, an urgent need to make both CMIM and CRA relevant and battle-ready. This can be achieved if some kind of bridging arrangement is drawn up between both the schemes—an agreement that allows members to access both pools in a crisis. At a later stage, this arrangement can be extended to other new members as well. 

The first reason for the bridging arrangement is the insufficient size of the IMF-delinked funds. In a payments crisis, the non IMF-linked amount will not be adequate to achieve stabilisation. This defeats the purpose of the framework. It is probably early days to judge the CRA’s efficacy on the basis of the initial funds; it is likely that there is a tacit agreement to induct more members later, like the NDB, and enhance the pool. The agreement with CMIM should then form the first stage of that proposed expansion. 

China is a common member in both CMIM and CRA. India is a part of ASEAN+6, the logical extension path for CMIM, which started off with ASEAN and was later extended to ASEAN+3. Pooled together, the CMIM and CRA combine will have $340 billion ($240 billion plus $100 billion), making it a formidable alternative to other existing multilateral arrangements. 

There is another reason for the CRA to seek combined pooling: the CMIM has already created a regional macro-economic surveillance unit, AMRO. Its purpose, according to AMRO’S website, is “…to monitor and analyse regional economies and to contribute to early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions and effective decision-making of the CMIM.” AMRO can become a credible surveillance unit, and deliver independent macro-economic surveillance and analysis, only if its membership expands, leading to deeper diversity and capacity. [20] Therefore, expanding with the CRA makes eminent sense since the structure is already in place. 

The pooling of resources will, of course, not be easy; there will be numerous political obstacles. Even assuming some kind of linkage is achieved, associated headaches could arise. Friction is bound to grow between what is a regional grouping (ASEAN+3) and the growing role of BRICS as the sole representative of emerging economies and the visible face of an alternative governance architecture. However, if the BRICS leadership has so far managed to overcome its own inherent incompatibility through consensus and discussions, it should also be able to manage contradictions with the CMIM. Also, as mentioned above, China is a common member; it can play a vital role in bringing the two together. 

In conclusion, there are no set formulae or established norms. The NDB will have to debate and discuss internally—as well as cooperate, coordinate, and consult with civil society—for building an alternate financial architecture, even if it has to be done within the confines of the existing framework. This is its mandate, this is what the developing countries require from the NDB. 

References

[1] G20 Information Centre, G20 Research Group, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html

[2] Singhal, Rajrishi, How Culture and Education Can Bind BRICS, Gateway House, 7 July 2015, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/brics-needs-new-binding-factors/

[3] BRICS Information Centre, Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil, http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-treaty.html

[4], Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs, Export-Import Bank of India, China Development Bank Corporation, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-NDB-memorandum-en.pdf

[5] BRICS Information Centre, Agreement on the New Development Bank, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-bank.html

[6] BRICS Information Centre, Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil, http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-treaty.html

[7] BRICS Information Centre, BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation; eThekwini Declaration, 27 March 2013, Durban, South Africa, http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html

[8] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Economic Community, 7 August 2003, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community

[9] Zhao, Abe and Vinod Kalloe, The ASEAN Economic Community 2015: On the road to real business impact KPMG Asia Pacific Tax Centre, , June 2014, https://www.kpmg.com/SG/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/TaxItax-The-ASEAN-Economic-Community-2015.pdf

[10] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, June 2015, http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/faqs/cmim.pdf 

[11] Ministry of Finance, government of Japan, Chairman’s Press Release on Asian Bond Markets Initiative, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/asean_plus_3/20030807_02 .htm

[12] Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility, Catalyzing more stable and efficient mobilization of Asian savings in the Region, http://www.cgif-abmi.org

[13] Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, Asian Monetary Unit & AMU Deviation Indicators, http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/

[14] International Monetary Fund, SDR Basket—Proposed Extension of the Valuation of the SDR, August 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/080415.pdf

[15] Mathur, Akshay, Incubating A Non-Dollar Architecture, Gateway House, 18 July 2014, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/incubating-a-non-dollar-architecture/

[16] Goyal, Ashima, Payment systems to facilitate South Asian integration, WP-2015-021, July 2015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2015-021.pdf

[17] BRICS Information Centre, Annex, Art24, Provision of Currencies, Agreement on the New Development Bank, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil, http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-bank.html

[18] Joyce, Joseph P, BRICS and the Bretton Woods Twins: Capital Ebbs and Flows, 29 July 2014, https://blogs.wellesley.edu/jjoyce/2014/07/29/the-brics-and-the-bretton-woodstwins/

[19] Cattaneo, Nicolette, Mayamiko Biziwick and David Fryer, The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement and Its Position In The Emerging Global Financial Architecture, South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 10, Economic Diplomacy Programme, March 2015, http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_view/752-policy-insights-10-thebrics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-and-its-position-in-the-emerging-global-financialarchitecture

[20] Hill, Hal and Jayant Menon, Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward, Working Papers in Trade & Development, No 2012/17, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University; September 2012, https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp2012/wp_econ_2012_17 .pdf

This was originally published in Gateway House: http://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Rishi_Fudan-full-report.pdf

Thursday, 19 March 2015

IMF And RBI — Lost In Transmission

The IMF’s 2014 review has some good GDP news but its reservations on interest rates bears closer attention. It can take 32 months for the effects of a an interest rate cut to be felt. What does this mean for the Indian economy?


Christine Lagarde International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director was in India on 16 March for a two-day trip following the 11 March release of the IMF’s 2014 annual review of the Indian economy. The review has some good GDP news for India. Predictably, everybody focused mostly on the growth forecast for 2014-15 and for 2015-16 and (expectedly) missed out IMF’s reservations on a key ingredient that facilitates growth in any economy — interest rates.

There’s a bit of a story behind the IMF’s salubrious growth forecast. The original set of two IMF documents (in which Indian GDP was initially estimated to grow by 6.3% in 2014-15 and by 6.5% in 2015-16) had to be supplemented by two additional reports — one a transcript of the discussion between IMF officials and media, and, two, a copy of the IMF Survey which updated India’s growth forecast, in line with the government’s new methodology. Consequently, IMF now expects India’s GDP to grow by 7.2% during fiscal 2014-15 and by 7.5% during 2015-16.

Growth junkies celebrated this international endorsement for India’s growth prospects. They have been hankering for a rate cut, arguing that the only thing standing between them and double-digit annual growth rates were intractably high interest rates. The Reserve Bank (RBI) has rewarded them with two rate cuts — one in January and another in early March, soon after announcement of Budget. There are now demands for more, and deeper, rate cuts.

But, if they had read the IMF report a bit more closely, they might have been disappointed. The source of frustration is an accompanying document released with the India country report — called Selected Issues (as background documentation) — which includes a chapter on monetary transmission. On the basis of an internal model, this document reckons that the two-stage transmission between a repo rate cut to bank lending rate cut, via the weighted average call money rate, takes a total of 32 months. The impact on deposit rates is faster at 23 months.

Translated, that means RBI’s repo rate cut in January 2015 is likely to result in lower bank lending rates only by September 2017. The final impact on economic output and price levels, and hence growth impetus, will take even longer to feed through the relevant economic linkages. While that does seem a bit extreme, there is no denying that there is a large, looming problem in the room that nobody wants to acknowledge: transmission problems, or crimps in the financial pipeline.

RBI’s rate actions tend to take ages to travel through the economic system before they translate into lower borrowing rates for firms and households at the other end. In short, the transmission time between RBI’s rate action and banks cutting their lending rates is inordinately long, fraught with uncertainties and resistant to any mapping or measurement. Hence, nobody knows — with any modicum of certainty — how exactly this decision travels through the system, or how long this entire process will take.

The IMF report also refutes RBI’s estimates regarding transmission time, as well as dents the central bank’s confidence of improving lags and lead times under the new monetary arrangement it has signed with the Centre. The Urjit Patel Committee had mentioned that “…monetary policy in India impacts output with a lag of about 2-3 quarters and WPI headline inflation with a lag of about 3-4 quarters and the impact persists for 8-12 quarters.”

RBI has on numerous occasions — through working papers, speeches, media interactions and committee reports — acknowledged the problem of transmission leads and lags in India’s monetary policy. Most reports agree that transmission in India works through a number of channels — interest rate, credit markets, foreign exchange rates, asset prices (such as equity or house prices), expectations (about future shocks and belief in central bank ability to counter adversity) — with the existing fiscal and monetary system acting as final arbiters of the speed of transmission.

In each of the channels mentioned above, there are speed-breakers that slow down the pace of transmission. In the interest rate channel, for example, the existence of a large informal sector with largely inelastic borrowing rates, or high interest rates charged in the microfinance sector, impede transmission of rate cuts to output and inflation. Take government borrowing. Not only does it artificially dampen interest rates, it also forcibly appropriates a fixed amount of the banking system’s lendable funds, providing banks with a disincentive to heed market signals. This is one of the things that make it difficult for an RBI repo cut to materialise as a bank lending rate cut.

The Indian financial sector is dominated by banks, with public sector bank providing the bulk of banking services. The unusually large presence of state-owned banks

Hence, in the face of the conflicting transmission time periods provided by IMF and RBI, as well as the existence of innumerable structural road bumps that hinder smooth diffusion of monetary policy, there are legitimate questions about the efficacy of the monetary policy arrangement between RBI and the government.

Kind courtesy Gateway House (here) and Hindu BusinessLine (here)

Friday, 14 November 2008

New Bretton Woods Or Globocops?


A new multilateral regulatory structure seems unlikely now, given that the Fed and some central banks would not like to be told what to do. But, there is bound to be greater global coordination between central banks

A FEW days ago, the US Federal Reserve opened swap lines of $120 billion with four countries — Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and South Korea — to keep international liquidity pipelines unclogged. A few days before that, the European Central Bank entered into foreign currency swaps with Iceland and Switzerland, even though they are not part of the Eurozone. A $12-billion swap line was also established with Denmark. ECB also offered Hungary a $6.4-billion loan to tide over its temporary liquidity shortage. The objective of these swap lines is the same — to ensure that the global financial system, especially the countries that are “systemically” important to the US and European economies, do not suffer from a temporary shortage of dollars or euros, leading to a further deepening of the global credit crisis.

Traditionally, this job should have gone to the International Monetary Fund. Conspiracy theory proponents will undoubtedly detect a dishonourable political design here — with developing countries demanding a more egalitarian shareholding structure in the multilateral institute, this is the only way in which both the US and Europe can maintain their sway over the global financial system. But, such extreme hypotheses apart, the IMF normally takes some time to design restructuring packages for distressed economies, while the Fed and ECB are more concerned with overnight and short-term liquidity issues. Plus, here’s the biggest difference — central banks can print money, while IMF has to depend on shareholders’ largesse. So, given the severity of the global financial crisis, both the Fed and the ECB are not leaving anything to chance, or to the IMF’s time-consuming methods.

They are now stepping into a role that is not specified in their mandate. For instance, ECB’s twin-edged mandate is to maintain price stability in the euro command area and to support the general economic policies of the European Community. The Fed’s conventional role, on the other hand, was to ensure full employment, but the oil shock of the 1970s saw US lawmakers adding inflation combat to that traditional mandate. With the current global financial blowout, both the Fed and ECB are now trying to broaden their usual role into some form of “global lenders of last resort”. They are now ready to provide liquidity to liquidity-starved nations in exchange for marketable and non-marketable instruments, even though such paper may be below the normally accepted credit-rating threshold.

This marks a sharp change from the way these central banks have operated over the years and may even provide some clues about how they will conduct their business in the future. The question that arises immediately, therefore, is: are central banks world-over going to morph into something different?

One thing is definite: henceforth, the Fed is sure to get responsibility for ensuring “stability in the financial system”. The Fed’s hands-off policy with regard to Wall Street and its high jinks has not gone down well with millions of US taxpayers who feel burdened with the responsibility of having to bail out errant banks and financial institutions. Academic and quasi-academic literature over the past few weeks is full of references to how central banks must now build efficient radar systems that can detect incipient trends of financial turmoil and head them off before they can grow in size. However, that’s easier said then done. Experts agree unanimously that it’s also very difficult to pinpoint asset-price bubbles early on in the game. Yet, the political impact of the recent experiences is likely to see lawmakers foisting central banks with some accountability.

As a corollary, central banks the world over will now find it difficult to keep monetary policy and bank supervision separate. There are already rumblings that central banks should have oversight over all components of the financial system, especially when recent experiences have shown that it takes no time for the contagion to spread from one segment to the other.

At a recent conference in Chile, Sveriges Riksbank’s deputy governor Lars Nyberg said: “I want to emphasise that monetary policy is perhaps not the most efficient instrument for preventing crises from happening. Even though a too loose monetary policy may contribute to the build-up of a bubble, it is less clear to what extent monetary policy can prevent such a build-up. It is quite likely that substantial interest rate increases, that central banks would find it hard to implement, would be required to achieve this. More moderate rate increases may, of course, still have an effect at the margin, not least as a signal from the central bank that there are certain concerns linked to prevailing developments. But a more capable line of defence to prevent financial crises is to have proper rules and effective supervision in place.”

Transparency is another word that is likely to be heard with increasing frequency in coming months. The demand that central banks lift the veil from their operations is being heeded in degrees, some with a greater extent of openness than some others. And then there are some which operate in a completely secretive environment. Add to this the fact that most financial markets are still opaque and you have a lethal combo. The extreme opacity in the way financial markets created and traded financial instruments is a major reason behind the current crisis. In the days ahead, lawmakers are certain to demand a greater measure of transparency from both central banks (since many commentators have also blamed central banks’ easy money policy for the turmoil) and financial markets.

Finally, will there be new Bretton Woods institutions, responsible for global financial governance, or will central banks become the new globocops? A new multilateral regulatory, institutional structure seems unlikely now, given that some central banks — especially the Fed — would not like to be told what to do. But, there is bound to be greater global coordination and a higher volume of data exchange between central banks. For instance, jointly, both the RBI and Fed should now be able to wring more data out of financial institutions on the sources behind participatory notes.


Published as Op-Ed in The Economic Times (November 14, 2008)