Will Jaitley Sow The Right Seeds?

As Finance Minister Arun Jaitley prepares to present the Budget on February 1, one issue will dominate his mindspace: agriculture. With large sections of India’s population depending on the farm sector, continuing distress has reached crisis proportions.

And this predicament manifested itself in the recent Gujarat elections where the BJP retained its majority but lost 16 seats from its 2012 tally. After the polls, Gujarat Chief Secretary J N Singh attributed this loss to farmer distress and unemployment. The distressing after-effects of demonetisation were felt most acutely in the agrarian economy.

This year sees Assembly elections in eight states, of which the predominantly agri-states Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh are currently ruled by the BJP. And in the 2019 general elections, the BJP will be forced to defend its 2014 majority. Hence, agriculture and allied industries will surely play a significant role in shaping the Budget.

Agriculture has been in deep crisis for some time now: The Central Statistics Office’s advance estimates for 2017-18 GDP growth show agriculture growing at 2.1 per cent in the current fiscal against 4.9 per cent during 2016-17.

Apart from the long-term structural issues ignored by all governments so far—fragmented land-holdings impairing productivity, constraints in the input (water, credit, seeds, fertilisers) supply chain, insufficient forward linkages, lack of market access, wastage—the current year has seen some additional low points. The Budget will focus on three areas in agriculture that will convince farmers to vote the BJP back.

Infrastructure: Weather reports showed that 2017 monsoons were bountiful, with a minor deficit. However, there were spatial disparities in distribution of rainfall. This affected kharif sowing in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh with pockets of stress recorded in Maharashtra and Karnataka.

This affected output and consequently incomes. It also brought home the age-old problem of how the slow pace of irrigation—covering only 40 per cent of cultivable land—has made agriculture overly dependent on monsoons. With frequent droughts, this infrastructure deficit translates into lower crop and incomes.

For example, an October 2017 presentation from rating agency Crisil showed MP felt the highest stress, with deficient rainfall aggravated by poor irrigation infrastructure. It also singled out Rajasthan, MP and Chhattisgarh which showed a dip in profits earned per hectare during 2017. Jaitley may decide to increase the budget allocation for irrigation, having allotted lower amounts in the previous years. There also needs to be a review of the money spent on irrigation projects which are not being used to their potential.

Sliding prices: During 2017, the arbitrary market structures and policies yielded lower profits for farmers, even with losses in some areas. Loss of income due to sliding prices is critical to understanding farmer distress. This even prompted farmer organisations to request Jaitley to ensure some kind of assured income for farmers in the Budget. The story of declining farmer income is illustrative of the policy missteps by the government.

For example, faulty signals to farmers in the previous year, especially through higher minimum support price (MSP) for certain crops (pulses, for example) led to a bumper crop in 2017. But callous trade policy, especially regarding free imports, led to a glut. To top this, the government’s procurement target was inexplicably kept at a low percentage of the total harvest. Prices inevitably crashed well below MSP and farmers had to sell their crop at non-remunerative prices.

There is also the undeniable shadow of the trader community—the BJP’s traditional vote bank—looming over the Centre’s agriculture policy. The government’s MSP policy has been floundering for a while because of insufficient education leading to low levels of awareness among farmers, inaccessible procurement centres forcing farmers to sell to local traders for lesser prices (in many cases to the local moneylender) and graft in the official procurement system.

The Centre’s eNAM (electronic National Agriculture Market) which provides farmers a platform for selling their produce by linking them electronically with traders across the country is still a work in progress.

Policy Politics: In an open letter to Jaitley, Ajay Vir Jakhar, chairman of Punjab State Farmers’ Commission, has argued that the government’s policies must pivot from “Food Policy” to “Farmers’ Policy”. This is a major change in focus and would require complete overhauling of the farm policy. This suggestion also encapsulates within it the dilemma that confronts policymakers: Should they design policy to ensure food for all at all costs or ensure fair income-generation opportunities for farmers that will also lead to food security?

The policy framework should also examine how to deal with farm-related payments which are entangled in red tape. For example, the crop insurance programme—Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, launched in 2016—has drowned farmers in a sea of paperwork and failed to provide either adequate or timely compensation. The failure of this scheme has been cited as one reasons for Gujarat farmers, especially Saurashtra-based farmers, to change their voting preferences.

Jaitley’s earlier Budgets devoted many sections and paragraphs to the farm economy. However, many of these policies, schemes and announcements were seen as course corrections, tinkering with existing schemes or just plain grandstanding. February 1 should give him an opportunity to make some substantive changes in the farm sector.

The above article was written for New Indian Express and can also be read here

Budget 2018: A Trinity of Challenges Confronts Arun Jaitley

Budget 2018 is Arun Jaitley’s last full budget before next year’s general election and he may choose to do nothing but wait it out

There is something magical about the number three. In Shakespeare’s tragic play, it is three witches who provide Macbeth with a prophecy. The Chinese consider three as the perfect number, three represents the holy trinity, and so on. Finance minister Arun Jaitley’s last Union budget turned out to be quite prescient when he presaged three identifiable risks for the Indian economy: the Federal Reserve increasing interest rates, oil prices rising, and a retreat from globalization. Most of these risks are playing out with slight variations.

There are new fault lines developing now and it will be interesting to see whether the upcoming Union budget has a toolkit for these challenges.

One emerging danger is the capital market’s decoupling from the real economy. This was perceptively highlighted in recent interviews by Uday Kotak, executive vice-chairman and managing director of Kotak Mahindra Bank. In one interview he said: “Money is coming to a broad funnel and it’s going into a narrow pipe where massive amount of Indian savers’ money is now going into few hundred stocks…The amount of money that’s going into small and mid-cap stocks is something on which we have to ask tough questions. Is there a risk of a bubble?”

Kotak could be on to something. According to data from the Association of Mutual Funds in India, investment in mutual funds (net of redemptions) during April-December 2017 was up 28% over the previous year’s corresponding period. Much of this is flowing into stocks and influencing key indices: the 30-share S&P BSE Sensex has appreciated over 29% in the one-year period between 18 January 2017, and 18 January 2018. No other asset class can match these returns. State Bank of India’s fixed deposits for one year pay 6.25%, the government’s 364-day T-bills were recently auctioned at a cut-off rate of 6.52%, metals have ranged between 14-18%, gold yielded about 4%, crude oil is roughly 6% up and real estate continues to remain in the dog-house.

Two provisos merit mention: bitcoins are excluded because they are not available widely (like art or horses) and all the above returns are taxable while returns from investment in stocks for more than a year are tax free.

Curiously, and by serendipitous timing, discussions over a long-term capital gains (LTCG) tax on equity holdings are suddenly in play. LTCG—defined as gains realized from equity sales after holding for more than a year—are exempt from taxation. Short-term capital gains are taxed at 15%. The LTCG debate looks and feels like a test balloon floated to gauge the mood for new taxes. The guessing now is that tax-free LTCG may require a longer holding period of, say, two years. Even then, it is unlikely to yield great tax revenues.

Herein lies Jaitley’s dilemma: a larger section of Indians is now affected (directly or indirectly) by market movements and there’s no saying how additional taxes will have an impact on share values. Jaitley may want another Tobin-like tax to slow down runaway markets—investors already pay securities transaction tax, averaging around Rs 7,400 crore annually—but without rocking the boat. The market’s reception to government slashing its additional borrowing programme by Rs 30,000 crore (Rs 300 billion) was euphoric—the BSE Sensex rose over 300 points—ignoring that Rs 20,000 crore (Rs 200 billion) extra will still be borrowed. It is all down to managing the news cycle so that markets do not reverse course.

The LTCG speculation may have been prompted by need for new tax sources, given the slowdown in overall tax revenue accretion—till November 2017, 57% of the full year’s target had been collected while expenditure has raced ahead. Tax revenue growth is slack because the goods and services tax is taking time to settle down. Cheerleaders have made much of the spike in income-tax collections (15% higher than the corresponding period last year) but are silent about the slowdown in indirect taxes which not only provide a larger proportion of tax collections every year but also indicate continuing stagnation in the real economy with direct repercussions on unemployment.

There are red lights flashing elsewhere. Post demonetisation, money supply is in a frisky zone—in the 12 months to 22 December 2017, it has grown by 10.5% against 6.2% in the previous 12-month period. This has forced the Reserve Bank of India to suck out around Rs3.4 trillion liquidity between 26 December and 6 January. So, a rate cut looks remote at the moment.

Add to these the persistence of risks Jaitley mentioned last year—oil prices inching up and the Federal Reserve’s December interest rate increase with more likely to come in 2018. Then there’s the US’s new corporate-friendly tax bill which provides companies incentives to take back home roughly $3 trillion of global profits—Apple, for example, has announced it is repatriating close to $252 billion.

All this complicates Jaitley’s task. This is his last full budget before next year’s general election and he may choose to do nothing but wait it out. But he has to contend with three (that number again) challenges, which will directly have an impact on eight state elections this year and a general election next year—balancing a hysterical stock market with a slow real economy, providing enough policy measures to incentivise private sector investment and spur job creation, ensuring adequate allocations for the rural sector given the continuing farm distress.

Beyond that, it is most likely to be a holding operation which, in itself, is no mean task.

The above article was first published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Fintech Moves In The New Year

Government and regulatory agencies expected to provide some policy actions and regulatory direction to fintech

The lingering after-effects of demonetisation were felt through calendar 2017. These were further buffeted by the introduction of the goods and services tax. Both events hastened the adoption of fintech, particularly digital payments. The trend is likely to be consolidated during 2018, with government and regulatory agencies expected to provide some policy actions and regulatory direction.

The government’s resolve was perhaps reinforced by EY Fintech Adoption Index 2017, which surveyed 22,000 respondents across 20 countries. India’s adoption rate is seen as among the highest in the world, second only to China’s. So, what can finance minister Arun Jaitley do in his last full budget that can further improve the adoption rate?

Some pending issues from last year’s budget need his attention first.

One, the 25-billion digital transactions target, spanning multiple platforms (Unified Payments Interface, Unstructured Supplementary Service Data, Aadhaar Pay, Immediate Payment Service and debit card), is likely to be missed. This will require the government to conduct additional research on what needs to be done, especially how best to ground such annual targets in reality.

The other pending issue is completing the formation of a Payments Regulatory Board, which was set up through an amendment to the Payment and Settlement Systems Act. While the new board was a follow-up to the Watal Committee’s recommendations, the composition of the board disregards the committee report’s spirit and intent. The board currently has equal number of representatives only from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the government.

There are a host of other targets and promises that were made in the previous budget that either remain unfulfilled or about which updates are not available in the public domain—such as, using Small Industries Development Bank of India’s refinancing role to allow small and micro units to access formal finance, or accelerating financial inclusion using digital payments platforms. In the forthcoming budget, Jaitley will need to iron out numerous regulatory and infrastructure issues.

The first move should be to re-imagine the role of National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). The company introduces itself as “an umbrella organization for all retail payments in India.” The NPCI was set up with the “guidance and support” of RBI and the Indian Banks Association for creating a reliable and robust payments infrastructure in India. Its shareholders are commercial and cooperative banks and its products are limited to only the banking industry. This is where the distortions set in.

Currently, NPCI is like the owner and major user of a common infrastructure facility and allows only select customers to use this resource. NPCI’s products should be given the tag of utility infrastructure, to be used as an open application programming interface by the fintech industry. This is likely to foster new products and innovation. In other words, if the government plans to use fintech to achieve financial inclusion, it cannot afford to exclude non-bank payment service providers from common utility infrastructure.

Second, administered merchant discount rates (MDR)—the rate which banks charge merchants for providing payment infrastructure—have been quite contentious, especially since they are seen as an intrusion into a commercial relationship between the card issuer (mostly a bank) and the merchant. The RBI’s latest regulatory guidance caps MDR charges to drive up merchant acceptance of digital payments. Two anomalies emerge which need some course correction.

The guidelines spell out differentiated capped rates, based on the annual turnover of the merchant. This might become cumbersome and subject to various abuses. There is another problem. The RBI’s moves can be viewed as a market development strategy for fostering greater acceptance of digital payments. However, in all such endeavours, it is desirable to spell out the sunset period. For instance, the Union cabinet has decided to subsidize merchants for all digital transactions below Rs2,000 for the next two years. Even if one ignores the policy’s overt political ambitions, there is a visible end-point for the exercise.

Third, the government must take a call on blockchains and crypto-currencies soon. The government and RBI have been repeatedly cautioning investors about risks of investing in cryptocurrency, especially bitcoin. Simultaneously, a committee under the secretary, economic affairs, in the finance ministry is examining all issues related to cryptocurrencies. Policy and regulatory action should try to remain a step ahead of market practices, especially since some Indian banks have already developed blockchain technology to deal with overseas clients. Axis Bank, ICICI Bank and Yes Bank have all separately developed, or tied up with technology companies, to use blockchain technology for faster cross-border remittances. For example, the State Bank of India has joined hands with 29 other banks and finance companies (including ICICI Bank) to fund BankChain, a blockchain based cross-border payments platform.

Finally, RBI’s guidelines on peer-to-peer (P2P) lending need further refinement to bolster the nation’s growing fintech credentials. The rules have confusing eligibility criteria, are ultra-conservative in lender exposure limits and allocate too much discretionary power to the central bank without spelling out specific trigger points for regulatory action.

The above article originally appeared in the Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Time To Go To FRDI Bill’s Roots

Controversy around the bail-in clause aside, FRDI Bill’s clauses 58 and 62(1) regarding governance of a firm declared critical are inherently conflicting

Much has been said and written about the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017. The FRDI Bill was scheduled for discussion in Parliament this winter session but will now have to yield to more immediate concerns such as the Gujarat election results and the Central Bureau of Investigation special court’s verdict on 2G spectrum allocation. In addition, the joint committee of both Houses is yet to submit its report on the bill.

Public discussions on the FRDI Bill have focused on the formation of a resolution corporation and its bail-in powers in the event of a financial company going bust. The said corporation will monitor financial services companies, in coordination with regulators, and resolve them in case of failure. Bail-in implies using the company’s various existing liabilities—different debt categories or deposits not covered by deposit insurance (all deposits over Rs1 lakh)—to resolve impending failure. This is different from bailout, which implies external help, such as government using taxpayer money.

There may be some merit in constructing a resolution regime, given the financial system’s broader linkages. But there are other equally larger issues that also need highlighting, especially because they explain how we got here.

First, there is a need to discuss the relevance of an imported idea, a palliative designed for a different disease in a different body. Soul-searching after the 2008 financial crisis and its broader systemic impact through economic linkages led to the idea of a resolution corporation. It was felt necessary to design shock absorbers to insulate the economy and other financial sector institutions in the event of one single organization going bust, à la Lehman Brothers. The idea was discussed in various global governance institutions and rules were framed.

Some of the global credit rating agencies have been following up assiduously on the progress of implementation. Eyebrows are raised at jurisdictions, especially emerging economies, continuing to defer a resolution regime or designing a custom-built framework suited to their economy. In the meantime, the US, the epicentre of the crisis—which used taxpayer money to bail out all banks, including ensuring hefty bonus payouts to bankers—continues to enjoy the highest credit rating. Irony has, of course, been missing from the global credit rating lexicon.

In India, the idea of a resolution corporation was advocated in 2013 by the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission. This was followed up in 2014 with a Reserve Bank of India (RBI) working group report on crafting a resolution regime for financial institutions. Finally, in 2016, a Union finance ministry committee submitted a draft code on the resolution of financial firms.

Speaking in Parliament on 21 December, Union finance minister Arun Jaitley defended the FRDI Bill, claimed that depositors’ money in public sector banks would be protected and said that the bill was the outcome of a commitment made by the previous government to G20. Jaitley is right. The resolution framework was part of the G20 leadership’s final declaration at the 2011 Cannes summit. Ironically, there’s also a segment in the same communique that’s titled ‘Avoiding Protectionism and Reinforcing the Multilateral Trading System’; see where that’s got us.

This goes to the heart of the issue. The Indian government’s willingness to accept a cut-and-paste formula is curious, coming as it does on the back of similar decisions in the past which seemed alien to the peculiar complexion of India’s financial services—salary cap for financial sector chief executive officers and tightening regulation of “shadow banks”, leading to a squeeze on non-banking financial corporations which provide a unique last-mile solution to the Indian banking system, among others. In a system where banks (with an overwhelming public sector presence) dominate the financial system and are extensively regulated by RBI, there should be some discussion about whether importing regulatory frameworks, in universum, makes sense. More pertinently, whether the bail-in provisions recommended in the Financial Stability Board’s October 2014 guidelines are applicable to India.

By the way, all those fond of citing Singapore’s examples of good governance should look at the city-state’s proposed resolution regime, which excludes all deposits and senior debt from bail-in.

Secondly, there’s the issue of democracy and fundamental rights. In its current form, the FRDI Bill disallows the proposed corporation’s resolution process from being challenged in courts. This might be necessary to avoid undue delays in the resolution process and to avoid failure of wobbly financial companies. But it’s also like a slippery slope: the overwhelming presence of government representatives on the corporation’s board (including regulators’ representatives) can convert the corporation into a blunt tool of vengeful political action. It also disregards the RBI working group’s recommendation that a grievance mechanism be built into the process.

The larger, moral question is: Why does the FRDI Bill have to start off by being ham-fisted and draconian? Add poor drafting to that list; think tank PRS Legislative Research demonstrates how clauses 58 and 62(1) regarding governance of a firm declared critical are inherently conflicting. There are other similarly inconsistent clauses.

Finally, there’s the spectre of new regulators chipping away at the powers of old regulators, such as RBI. It raises the question: Does it really remedy anything?

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Sports And The Ease of Doing Business

There is no arguing that sports and sporting events should be made more inclusive

A recent statement by Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, Union minister of state for youth affairs and sports, has rattled many private television broadcasters operating in India. Delivering the keynote address at the Confederation of Indian Industry’s (CII’s) Big Picture Summit, he said that media has an important role in taking sports to each and every home in India.

The minister’s intentions are honourable and desirable. But when combined with recent reports in this newspaper and elsewhere that the sports ministry is working with the ministry of information and broadcasting to declare cricket’s Indian Premier League (IPL) a tournament of “national importance”, it has multiple implications. This column usually eschews discussions on policy issues which are works-in-progress, but the multiple consequences of such a policy move are compelling enough to merit a moment of pause.

At the moment, the minister is only thinking aloud. But if the decision does come through, it will require a private sector network that won exclusive media rights to this tournament in an open auction conducted by the Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) to share its live feed of the event with national broadcaster Doordarshan under the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007.

Section 3(1) of the Act states: “No content rights owner or holder and no television or radio broadcasting service provider shall carry a live television broadcast on any cable or Direct-to-Home network or radio commentary broadcast in India of sporting events of national importance, unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal, without its advertisements, with Prasar Bharati to enable them to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and Direct-to-Home networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be specified.” Section 3(2)(1) of the Act also requires the “contents rights owner” (private broadcaster) to share 25% of advertising revenue with Prasar Bharati.

Apart from the relevance and applicability of the Act to IPL, whether the IPL can be termed an event of national importance or whether the statements were meant to influence the Gujarat state election, two critical issues stand out.

One, any possible ex-post intervention by the two ministries will go against the grain of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strenuous efforts to improve the ease of doing business in India. The private broadcaster won the rights to broadcast IPL matches via television, digital media, Indian and overseas media for five years on payment of Rs16,347.5 crore. This winning bid was probably calculated on the basis of certain metrics and revenue projections. But, if the two ministries follow through on their plans, it is likely to send all calculations awry. The issue once again raises the spectre of retrospective action, something that makes it vulnerable to international arbitration and investor anathema.

There is no arguing that sports and sporting events should be made more inclusive. Unlike many other developed countries where access to sports—including tennis or golf—is getting increasingly democratized, sports access in India remains largely sequestered behind elite walls. Even popular sports like football and hockey remain out of reach for a vast section of India’s population. Therefore, the ministry’s attempts to foster a deeper sporting culture and expand sports infrastructure is quite commendable.

However, as a policy imperative, this should have been included as part of the auction’s terms and conditions and not articulated as an afterthought. Bidders would have then structured offers differently, factoring in the changed dynamics and sharing of advertising revenue. Inclusion of the national network would definitely bring more eyes to the event, which would justify the sharing of advertising revenue. The contra argument is that with additional access points now available, it would reduce traffic to the original broadcaster, thereby having an impact on the overall revenue.

That brings us to the second point.

According the IPL the proposed special status raises multiple questions: What trigger points are necessary to declare a tournament of national importance? Can any minister, ministry or government department declare anything nationally important?

What adds to the confusion is whether the ministry of sports and youth affairs has any category listed as “nationally important”. The ministry currently has four categories created to determine eligibility for Central assistance: high priority, priority, general and other. The ministry documents: “In the ‘High Priority’ category, the sports played in the Olympic Games and in which India has won medals in last conducted Asian Games as well as Commonwealth Games or in which India has good chance of winning medals in Olympics have been included.” There are nine high priority sports and cricket is not one of them—athletics, archery, badminton, boxing, hockey, shooting, tennis, weightlifting and wrestling.

The Constitution’s seventh schedule puts sports in List II, or areas where states have jurisdiction. The ministry has been trying to include it in the Concurrent List; till that happens, it is questionable whether any declarations can be made. To be fair, the ministers have not yet got around to acting on their thoughts. But thinking aloud or even vocalizing arbitrary government intervention can send mixed signals to potential investors.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

PPP: Private Profits Promoted

In a PPP framework, the private sector partner needs to maximize profit, which is not always compatible with the stated objective of providing universal access to quality services

The news of how much a private hospital recently charged a patient’s family for dengue treatment, despite not being able to save the patient’s life, has was met with outrage and revulsion. The private healthcare facility, based in the National Capital Region, has denied accusations of over-charging and has justified the bill raised on the family of the deceased.

While social media users may have been hasty and impulsive in apportioning blame for the alleged fudging, it is imperative that the matter be investigated and, if wrongdoing is proven, future remedial measures provided. This is easier said than done. This simple act, normal in any rules-based jurisdiction, is unlikely to reach any logical conclusion or create mitigating circumstances for avoiding repeat performances in the future. One reason is the lack of a proper regulatory framework—whether sector-specific or for entities shadowing the public-private partnership (PPP) model.

At its core, this unseemly incident also questions the nature of government’s ties with the private sector. While there is no doubt that the government needs to partner the private sector in multiple areas, one unavoidable question keeps popping up: How is the lack of sectoral regulators, coupled with the government’s increasing and unflinching faith in the private sector’s capacity to deliver social sector targets despite evidence to the contrary, affecting outcomes?

NITI Aayog vice-chairman Rajiv Kumar hit the nail on the head during a conversation with The Indian Express staffers recently: “All these private hospitals...they have been given land at a very cheap cost—it is really like a public asset—on the premise that they will do what they promised.... I am convinced that private hospitals in the tertiary space need far better regulation than what is in place now. They must be made to stick to what they have promised.”

Indeed, the lack of sectoral regulators is aggravating the risk profile of numerous sectors. In many sectors, the government doubles up as both service provider and regulator, creating serious conflict of interest. It also raises questions about sequencing: should private sector be allowed entry into various sectors without first establishing independent or autonomous regulatory structures? In the absence of a credible regulator or a regulatory framework, empirical evidence shows the sector often falls prey to regulatory capture and cronyism.

Even the Vijay Kelkar committee, set up to revitalize the PPP model in infrastructure, endorsed the setting up of independent regulators: “The committee cannot overstate the criticality of setting up independent regulators in sectors going in for PPPs.”

The Indian healthcare industry is a prime example of how lack of sectoral regulation has resulted in government ceding space to the private sector, even in urban primary healthcare centres in some cases. This has multiple consequences, especially with regard to levy of user charges which remains unregulated. From there, it is just one step to billing a patient for over 600 syringes during a two-week stay, which works out to an absurd consumption figure of 43 syringes a day.

Ironically, the National Health Policy 2017, while advocating a larger role for the private sector, has reserved the regulatory role for the ministry, albeit with a deadpan display of diffidence: “The regulatory role of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare—which includes regulation of clinical establishments, professional and technical education, food safety, medical technologies, medical products, clinical trials, research and implementation of other health related laws—needs urgent and concrete steps towards reforms. This will entail moving towards a more effective, rational, transparent and consistent regime.”

The PPP framework has many in-built infirmities: there are asymmetries in how the government and the private sector partner share revenue and risks.

There is another fundamental problem with PPPs in the social infrastructure space: the private sector partner needs to maximize profit, which is not always compatible with the stated objective of providing universal access to quality services.

The World Bank’s page on public-private partnerships, while describing the Indian model, says that bids are usually evaluated based on the lowest cost to government. It is common knowledge that the lowest cost bid mode is a slippery slope and prone to abuse and sub-optimal outcomes.

Perhaps, as McKinsey, World Bank and the World Economic Forum have told us on different occasions, the PPP model is indeed the way ahead to improve healthcare delivery in India. But, it is also important to get the design right to make the delivery cost-efficient, timely, affordable and profitable for all stakeholders.

Beyond the PPP nuts-and-bolts, there lies a larger moral question centred around the philosophy of social contract and the elasticity of powers afforded to an elected government. Part of the understanding or compact between the citizen and the elected legislative is that taxation revenue will be used to provide public goods, especially to those who are unable to pay user charges. Over the past 10-15 years, the government has steadily relinquished its space to the private sector as the sole provider of public goods and services, with the private sector player gradually introducing arbitrary and unregulated user charges. This breach of contract has serious implications for society.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

The Rich Know How to Sidestep Responsibilities

The Paradise Papers show how the wealthy and powerful use tax havens—some do it legitimately, others for re-routing illegal wealth—to avoid or evade tax liabilities

Three developments over the past few weeks provide pointers to how the rich, whether individuals or nations, behave when it comes to meeting obligations.

The Paradise Papers have revealed how wealthy and powerful individuals use tax havens—some do it legitimately and some for re-routing illegal wealth—to either avoid or evade tax liabilities. The examples also highlight how this corrosive affliction equally infects industrialists and politicians.

The second example relates to the behaviour of rich nations, which have unabashedly deployed evasive tactics at Bonn, host to the 2017 UN Climate Change Conference to implement the Paris Agreement signed in 2015. The rich countries have been trying every trick to avoid meeting commitments on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, arresting climate change and funding developing and poor countries to help counter the effects of climate change. The US, European Union and some other rich countries—including Australia, Canada and Japan—have blocked efforts by developing nations to review the developed world’s performance vis-à-vis commitments.

Developing nations have been blaming the rich for sidestepping commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol, which placed mandatory emission reduction targets to be achieved during 2012-15. Later, through what is known as the Doha Amendments, the target date was extended to 2020. Developing countries have been arguing that to finalize the rule-book for the Paris Agreement, as the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, it is necessary to understand the achievements so far.

For instance, as part of the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, the developed countries pledged to provide developing nations with $30 billion during 2010-12 and $100 billion every year till 2020 to help mitigate climate change effects. The understanding was that since the industrialized nations were historically responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and the consequent global warming, they have a moral obligation to help poor countries, especially island nations, offset the adverse effects of climate change. But, as data shows, the rich are not only in breach but have been dissembling: Apart from reneging on their promise, they have also been padding funding data.

The third example crosses the Atlantic Ocean to Washington, DC, where the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were held a month ago. Among other things, the agenda included the Bank’s pivot towards a new financing mode, for which it has been laying the ground over the past few months. The new strategy is called the “cascade approach”, under which Bank president Jim Yong Kim proposes to convert “billions into trillions”, essentially by leveraging the Bank’s financing and crowding in private investment.

The Bank released a document in September titled “Maximising Finance For Development: Leveraging The Private Sector For Growth And Sustainable Development”. This builds on a preceding March 2017 document called “Forward Look—A Vision For The World Bank Group In 2030, Progress And Challenges”. This document defines the scope: “... The Cascade first seeks to mobilize commercial finance, enabled by upstream reforms where necessary to address market failures and other constraints to private sector investment at the country and sector level. Where risks remain high, the priority will be to apply guarantees and risk-sharing instruments. Only where market solutions are not possible through sector reform and risk mitigation would official and public resources be applied.” Currently focused on infrastructure, the approach will be later extended to financial services, healthcare, education and agribusiness.

On the surface, it sounds like a logical progression of the Bank’s strategy and, at a theoretical level, the right thing to do. The Bank, in some senses, seems to be heeding conservative economists who have for long contended that the Bank crowds out the private sector and, therefore, must step back and facilitate private sector project funding. But there’s no avoiding the tricky questions: How do you manage the political economy of reforms, who will bear the risks, how will risk be eliminated, what will be the role of user charges, what is the private sector’s exact role, and, what happens in countries with minimal private sector presence? There are also concerns about involving the private sector in healthcare and education, especially because private and public interests are rarely aligned. Many of these concerns have already played out in India.

To be fair, the Bank’s hands are tied because the rich countries, especially the US, have refused to provide additional capital. India’s finance minister Arun Jaitley was forced to comment at the annual meeting: “The possibility of generating sufficient resources through the management levers has had only a marginal impact given the scale of capital requirement, and hence, early capital infusion into WBG (World Bank Group) is an imperative... The excessive emphasis on the ‘Cascade Approach’ to determine suitability of the financing source and mechanism does not have potential to make a big difference. Applying cascade approach to every project posed to the World Bank will lead to considerable delay. We should be careful in applying this approach especially to social sector projects.”

What is worrying is that the lessons of 2007 and earlier crises are being forgotten as soon as the first signs of economic growth are visible in the Western economies.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Bank Recapitalisation: Slow-Mo Replay

Scepticism over bank recapitalisation plan is fuelled by the government’s predilection for grandiose policy announcements without adequate preparation or execution

Like all things Indian, there are multiple ways of viewing Union finance minister Arun Jaitley’s comprehensive presentation on the Indian economy and the package of measures formulated to provide some momentum to a decelerating economy.

One is to view government as profligate: throwing caution to the winds, raiding the exchequer and reaping subsequent political dividends. With state assembly elections due in Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh, this package seems custom-built to address concerns over slowing growth, rising unemployment and the severe economic dislocation which followed demonetisation and implementation of the goods and services tax.

Some may even view this development as a snub to the reconstituted Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council (EAC). Convened to suggest measures to revive the economy, the council rebuffed calls for a fiscal stimulus programme during its maiden 11 October meeting. EAC chairman Bibek Debroy ostensibly acknowledged, during his post-meeting press briefing, that there was indeed an economic slowdown but, puzzlingly, declined to publicly list the reasons. The new package can thus be seen as realpolitik trumping good economic sense.

Viewed through a different lens, the package can be seen as an attempt to generate temporary feel-good with all the right ingredients thrown in—large numbers, a dizzying number of projects, heady growth estimates. This scepticism is fuelled by the government’s predilection for grandiose policy announcements without adequate preparation or execution. What further bolsters the cynicism is the inordinate rush to announce schemes without fleshing out details: for example, the Rs2.1 trillion bank recapitalisation plan lacks all the relevant details. There is another reinforcing factor: the government has front-ended announcements of funds injection, but all mentions of painful restructuring, if any, have been kept for later.

There is another nuanced view. Keeping the political compulsion as a constant, since the impact of the economic distress on impending elections cannot be ruled out, Jaitley’s package tries to walk a fine line by providing an economic stimulus while also heeding fiscal concerns. While this assessment does seem closer to reality, implementing it is unlikely to be easy. For example, it will be difficult for the government to undertake all the listed infrastructure projects without any budgetary support, given the private sector’s current inability to pitch in with capital.

Many observers and analysts have inveighed against the recapitalisation programme even though the final design is yet to be revealed. They see it as rewarding banks with a free get-out-of-jail card without any corrective measures to avoid repeating past mistakes. There’s also the moral hazard question: recapitalisation studies conducted globally have shown that banks receiving fresh government capital tend to exhibit increased risk-taking activity compared with banks deprived of capital infusion. There are other studies which show that recapitalisation stimulates the credit cycle for only larger banks and existing borrowers. This then contradicts the government’s assertion that recapitalisation will lead to increased credit availability for the micro-, small- and medium-enterprise segment.

While these are legitimate concerns, the recapitalisation programme seemed like a fait accompli, especially since banks were caught in a vicious cycle, leading to a credit impasse which exacerbated the economic distress. As the largest shareholder, it was incumbent on the government to recapitalize banks to kick-start the credit cycle and growth process. Banks could have raised fresh capital from the market by diluting the government’s stake, but their contaminated books made that impossible.

Ideally, recapitalisation and restructuring should go together. The government’s current plan incorporates one without the other or, at best, inserts a time lag between the two actions. Many commentators have been clamouring for an accompanying restructuring programme. One suggestion is to reduce the government’s stake in public sector banks, which, then, one naïvely assumes will provide banks with operational autonomy. Will, say, a 30% or 40% stake prevent ministers and government officials from calling up a bank’s chief executive and influencing credit decisions? Government intervenes in a bank’s credit operations in many other ways.

The Banking Regulation Act mandates that a bank’s board, apart from the executive directors and the regular government nominee (usually a conscientious bureaucrat), should also include professionals with knowledge of accountancy, agriculture and rural economy, cooperatives, small-scale industry, among others. Governments often exploit this section to appoint party loyalists and sympathizers under one category or another since the eligibility criteria is not rigid. These nominees then enjoy unofficial government imprimatur to intermediate between the bank and Big Business. This gap must be plugged.

The other demand is for complete privatization but, realistically speaking, the political economy will not allow that. And, even if that goes through, it is not fool-proof because some of the largest private banks are also struggling with mountains of bad loans featuring the usual suspects: large corporations. A sustainable, long-term solution must therefore include punitive measures for all wilful defaulters, especially majority shareholders, and not just politically convenient soft targets.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Globalization: Much Needed, Yet So Treacherous

The unravelling of the quarter-century-old global economic order will have many effects, some unpredictable but mostly unavoidable

Developments in Germany have surprised those rejoicing defeats of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Alternative for Germany (AfD) has won 13% of votes and is Bundestag’s third largest party; significantly, it’s the first time since World War II that a far-right, nationalist party has done this well. AfD will surely want to add momentum to this regained arc of history by chipping away at the economic and social policies that we now take for granted. They are no longer at the gate; they are just one step away from the round table.

It’s not happening in Germany alone. The assault on the established order has begun even in the US and UK, with policies now resolutely inward-looking. The global right wants to fashion many changes, including the framework upon which the current idea of globalization is draped. Politician Shashi Tharoor writes in his Project Syndicate column that the backlash against globalization will be felt on both cultural and economic fronts. The unravelling of the quarter-century-old global economic order will have many effects, some unpredictable but mostly unavoidable.

India’s version of the new world order is still work-in-progress, though early signs indicate a somewhat dichotomous character. India’s social and diplomatic policies are making a departure from the past, including moving away from their pluralistic, cosmopolitan and multicultural moorings. The resistance to Rohingya migrants—including hapless children, women and the elderly—under the implausible and untenable pretext of pre-empting Islamic terrorism is an example.

But, conversely, the current administration’s economic policies endorse the late 20th century world order, which includes an openness to financial globalization and a dogged belief in an economic orthodoxy that has been discarded elsewhere. Ironically, financial globalization—especially portfolio flows—is like the two-faced Janus: much needed yet so treacherous.

McKinsey Global Institute’s report, “The New Dynamics Of Financial Globalization”, sees a return to a “more stable, more risk-sensitive era of financial globalization” though manifold risks remain. India has been a beneficiary of global capital flows. Since opening up to foreign portfolio flows in 1992-93, India has received net inflows of Rs12.6 trillion, of which 32% was invested in debt instruments. In the first five months of 2017-18 (till 15 October), while equities saw net outflows of Rs7,054 crore, debt instruments received Rs1.11 trillion. This could be the fabled chink.

The first warning comes from Mervyn King, a former Bank of England governor and vocal supporter of Aston Villa football club. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, King warns of a “bumpy decade ahead” because of over-borrowing and the spectre of rising interest rates in the developed economies leading to a rash of defaults. This doomsday prediction might resonate with India’s twin balance-sheet problem (over-leveraged companies and contaminated banks). The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is under pressure to cut interest rates, not raise them. Assuming the RBI does slash rates, the slightest disruption in the global economy could still spell trouble, given Indian corporate and financial sector’s over-reliance on foreign capital.

The second alert comes from Deutsche Bank’s chillingly titled report, “The Next Financial Crisis”. It shows how the frequency of financial crises has increased after the Bretton Woods system broke down in the early 1970s, especially since it allowed nations to issue fiat currency without any disciplining restraint. The report lists 11 probable sources for the next crisis, which include central bank unwinding, escalation of global imbalances or Italy going bust. In short, the report states that the current global economy is “particularly prone to a cycle of booms, busts, heavy intervention, recovery and the cycle starting again...there will likely be another financial crisis/shock pretty soon with their frequency continuing to be high until we create a more stable global financial framework.”

Christine Lagarde, managing director of International Monetary Fund, provides the third cautionary note, saying that balance sheet unwinding by Western central banks, particularly the Fed, could lead to capital outflows from emerging economies and the ensuing volatility could even spill over into the domestic economy. She advocates gradualism and increased communication between central banks.

The fourth arrow comes from the bow of Jerome H. Powell, a member of Federal Reserve System’s board of governors. Like his predecessors, Powell reiterates that adverse consequences from central bank unwinding will be felt only by emerging economies with fundamental vulnerabilities, thus absolving Fed of fomenting global instability. While admitting that emerging economies are better placed this time to manage outcomes, he says significant risks remain. Powell cites research that puts emerging markets’, including the Indian, corporate sector debt at vulnerable levels; any interest rate increase, accompanied by earnings drop and exchange rate volatility can create “unpredictable and outsized” surprises.

So, while growth in the US and Europe is still gradual, Indian policy managers need to urgently put some risk mitigation measures in place. An obvious one is to immediately recapitalize public sector banks. The second is to actively catalyse investment: waiting for miracles to happen while drawing up a 10-point programme is so 42 years old.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can be read here

India’s New Gene Is Called Plutocracy

India has been called a plutocracy for its manifest disposition towards the rich and the powerful

The stampede at Mumbai’s Elphinstone Road train station last week, which claimed 27 lives, holds up a mirror to India’s policy bias towards the rich and powerful. Many people (including this columnist) impulsively tweeted about the government’s penchant for bullet trains versus apathy towards basic infrastructure for daily commuters; the tragedy, though, showcases a much larger malaise, one that has been patronized by successive governments.

The catastrophe can be sourced to how politicians and industrialists colluded to develop Lower Parel, an erstwhile textile mill neighbourhood that has now been converted into malls, offices, TV studios, restaurants and residential blocks by tweaking rules and with complete disregard for the livelihood of its original residents, public transport or traffic growth. 

All cities around the world redevelop and rejuvenate urban areas but do so with some thought to forward and backward linkages. The rules designed to facilitate Lower Parel’s development had a sole objective: to help mill owners unlock land value without any thought of how millions of office workers and service providers would enter and exit the area. End result: the loss of lives at the Elphinstone Road station.

There is a name for this. India has often been called a plutocracy for its manifest disposition towards the rich and the powerful. Plutocracy, in short, can be defined as rule by the wealthy and the powerful, where policies and systems are designed to deliver greater benefits to the wealthy and powerful. Consequently, plutocracy eats away at the core of any democratic system.

A recent paper by Lucas Chancel and Thomas Piketty shows how India’s average real income growth accelerated post-2000. Simultaneously, it also shows how the top 10% grew at a much faster rate than the average, while income growth of the balance 90% fell below average. While the authors avoid offering any conclusions about the impact of economic reforms on inequality or poverty in India, their findings point to an uncomfortable truth: Post the 1980s, when the process of economic reforms began, the top 1% in India have seen their incomes and wealth grow at a much faster rate than the balance 99%.

Increasing wealth concentration among the rich is corroborated by Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Report 2016: India’s top 1%, which owned 36.8% of the country’s wealth in 2000, now owns close to 58% of the wealth (the global average is 50%). An Oxfam 2017 report showed that 57 Indian billionaires own as much as the bottom 70% of the population.

Another paper by Dilip M. Nachane and Aditi Chaubal (goo.gl/gxLcwd) finds a plutocratic bias in the way India’s consumer price index (CPI) is constructed, by attaching greater weightage to items of expenditure consumed by higher income groups. This has enormous implications for policy design, especially when the Reserve Bank of India has selected CPI as its chosen benchmark for inflation targeting.

Plutocracy is also characterized by suborning of national institutions. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are perhaps the best examples of how this financing mode was used to reward private sector partners with state resources (including valuable real estate) with the government (or government-owned institutions) shouldering the bulk of project risk. 

For example, in airport PPPs, private partners have been treating public land as private property. Of course, there were many PPPs that failed because of bureaucratic stasis or other extraneous reasons but the fundamental flaw in Indian PPPs was hard to miss.

Plutocracy can also be identified in the way institutions behave. India’s largest commercial bank, the State Bank of India (SBI), decided to step outside its sandbox and experiment with new revenue sources: it decided to penalize customers who failed to maintain the monthly average balance in their savings bank account.

This example was quickly emulated by some other private banks. SBI’s haste and poor planning in announcing and executing the new revenue stream came back to bite it: a torrent of protests has forced the SBI to exempt pensioners and minors (whose accounts typically empty out soon after money is deposited) and reduce the penalty amounts for other depositors.

Policy haste, without thinking through the consequences, is quite commonplace in India, whether in government or in institutions. 

The SBI example shows how policy moves when it does not take into account customer profile, feasibility options or its impact on various income groups. Demonetization is another example of how an autarchic policy decision affected livelihoods for a wide spectrum of the population. 

What’s more worrying is the bias in policy towards those with more money, power or both. Typically, by the time public policy emerges from drawing board to final design, political and business influences shape its biases.

It is instructive to note the role of politicians in plutocracy. The Supreme Court recently upbraided the Centre for the rapid—and, in some cases, inexplicable—rise in politicians’ assets. Interestingly, when one of their own was banned from flying for perpetrating violence against airline staffers, parliamentarians banded together to get him a reprieve. 

On the rebound, though, the aviation ministry has now empowered airlines to unilaterally ban “unruly” passengers, without offering citizens any means of contesting the one-sided rule. The odds are always stacked against ordinary citizens in a plutocracy.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here.