Showing posts with label Planning Commission. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Planning Commission. Show all posts

Wednesday, 6 September 2017

Pointers To A Future-Ready Payments Policy

Regulation, almost always, lags technology development. But an opportunity to create a future-ready policy framework now seems close at hand


Events over the past few weeks have thrown up numerous pointers to what should be included in a future payments-system policy framework.

The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI’s) 2017-18 annual report provided the first clue, proving a well-known policy paradigm: competition and freedom of choice are essential tools to avoid distorting markets and the broad economy. An overnight ban on Rs500 and Rs1,000 bank notes—accounting for about 85% of outstanding currency—dealt a body-blow to the economy in terms of jobs, incomes, livelihoods, investment appetite and overall economic growth. The ruinous effects manifested themselves last week: gross domestic product for April-June quarter grew by only 5.7%, the lowest in many quarters.

Demonetisation amounted to suppression of free choice—or freedom to decide how much cash to use, for which transactions—though different reasons were adduced to justify the decision. One of the reasons cited, which has persisted into the post-demonetisation period, is a desire to foster digital payments and to migrate the economy to a less-cash system.

This is a desirable economic objective. However, the policy vectors put in place reveal multiple gaps: lack of a robust competition and innovation policy; uncertainty over the payment regulator’s quasi-legislative powers; an unclear road map for achieving financial inclusion; and, an asymmetric preference hierarchy between different payment systems imposed on the consumer. The last one violates democratic principles by coercing the public to move away from a relatively low-cost payment system (such as cash) to a higher cost platform (such as, mobile wallets which involve connectivity costs).

The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) recent ruling on right to privacy as a fundamental right is likely to complicate the regulatory debate further and might necessitate a systems rethink. The judgement reads: “The balance between data regulation and individual privacy raises complex issues requiring delicate balances to be drawn between the legitimate concerns of the State on one hand and individual interest in the protection of privacy on the other.” The nine-judge bench, while acknowledging that the Centre has already appointed a committee under former SC judge B.N. Srikrishna to study the state of India’s data privacy and to submit a draft bill, hopes that the Union government will take “all necessary and proper steps”.

Still, the right to privacy ruling in itself does set out a future regulatory perimeter for digital financial services. The bench found some pointers in a 2012 report from an expert group on privacy, appointed by the erstwhile Planning Commission. Specifically, the report mentions a five-pillar conceptual scaffolding for drafting legislation to protect privacy: technological neutrality and inter-operability with international standards, which is still lacking; multi-dimensional privacy; horizontal applicability to state and non-state entities to ensure a level-playing field; conformity with privacy principles in line with global best practices; and a co-regulatory enforcement regime which envisages co-existence of independent regulators and self-regulating organizations. Ironically, some of these issues are still being debated in the policy space.

There are multiple views on what to make of SC’s judgement; for example, Chennai’s IFMR Trust, soon after the SC ruling, published a blog advocating stakeholder consultation to determine what kinds of data can and should be collected, the desirable regulatory regime for data mining and algorithmic techniques and a legislative terrain to “ensure that use of personal data is tied to legitimate proportional objectives and interests”.

There is another critical, and slightly obvious, ingredient necessary in the future regulatory mix: trust. This was evident when digital payments spiked during November-December 2016 and then tapered off subsequently; people abhor repression and any attempts to increase the value and volume of digital payments must be achieved through trust, not duress. Regulation must have a consumer bias and should not be designed to favour some service providers.

Lack of trust in paper money issued by sovereigns, and controlled by central banks, is growing as is wider acceptance of crypto-currencies. Already six large global banks—Barclays, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, State Street and the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group—have jointly launched a project to use block-chain for clearing and settling financial transactions, reducing time taken for conventional money transfers.

While bitcoins and other crypto-assets are still in an embryonic state in India, the pace of acceptance is slowly picking up. Many community-based initiatives have been advocating block-chain as an alternative to organized finance, viewed as exploitative. The finance ministry appointed a nine-member inter-disciplinary committee to suggest the way forward with crypto-currencies; the committee has submitted its report, which has not been made public yet. Eventually, though, RBI will have to decide whether it will allow money to also exist as crypto-currency, in addition to its role as a commodity (with or without intrinsic value), a financial claim and/or as an accounting entry.

Regulation, almost always, lags technology development. But an opportunity to create a future-ready policy framework now seems close at hand.

The article originally appeared in Mint newspaper on September 6, 2017, and can also be read here

Wednesday, 19 April 2017

Road To Growth Is Paved With Low ICOR

India’s slowing investment rate and rising incremental capital output ratio, or ICOR, have led to low economic growth.

Two recent, and epochal, events deserve our unstinted attention because they mark the end of an era and the beginning of another one. These are critical because of a common thread linking both: the investment rate of the economy.

The 12th Five-year Plan has just ended, bringing down the curtain on decades of India’s planned economic growth and development. This was the last Five-year Plan; as an alternative, the Planning Commission’s successor NITI Aayog has announced the release of a three-year “action plan”, a seven-year “strategy paper” and a 15-year “vision document”. There is one key difference between these documents and Five-year Plans: The government is free to disregard the Aayog’s recommendations.

The end of a centrally planned economic system also coincides with the formal interring of the Planning Commission, an organization central to not only India’s economic strategy but also to its federal temper through the added responsibility of allocating grants, Plan and non-Plan funds to states. The commission’s federal remit was not granted through constitutional mandate and this generated sufficient heartburn, especially among non-Congress states. However, the commission’s shuttering is also due to questions raised about the relevance of centralized planning in a globalized, market-led economy. And then there is politics. The commission was created through a government resolution which makes it easy for the Narendra Modi government to bury it.

But before the institution is shut down, it might be worthwhile to examine the 12th Plan performance, especially some of its macroeconomic targets. The 12th Plan ran between April 2012 and March 2017, with a Congress-led administration in charge till April 2014 and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government steering the Plan thereafter. Prime Minister Modi announced his intentions of abolishing the commission and ending Five-year Plans during his first Independence Day speech in 2014 but allowed the 12th Plan to formally run till its original expiry date.

The plan had set an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth target of 8% for the 2012-17 period. This growth target was not achieved in any single year by either of the two political dispensations, despite a step jump resulting from a new series introduced by the Modi government. The closest India came was in 2015-16, with 7.9% annual growth. Otherwise, the average growth for the period works out to below 7%, way lower than the average annual growth rate of 8% achieved during the 11th Plan.

A low investment rate is among the many reasons for the under-average performance. The 12th Plan envisaged an average investment rate of 34%. However, the investment rate has been declining every year, starting with 33.4% during the first year of the Plan; the Central Statistical Office’s second advance estimates for 2016-17 show gross fixed capital formation at 26.9% of GDP, the lowest in more than a decade. What’s worse, investments have not been forthcoming from either the private sector (which has historically contributed the bulk of investment as a percentage of GDP) or the government sector which should ideally be investing when private investment dries up.

In a recent newspaper article, former Reserve Bank of India governor C. Rangarajan has also pointed to low productivity of capital, captured through incremental capital output ratio, or Icor, which measures how many additional units of capital are necessary to produce one additional unit of output. India’s slowing investment rate and rising Icor have led to low economic growth.

Discussing Icor might sound anachronistic, especially since the service sector accounts for 55% of India’s GDP where the relation between capital invested and output is still unclear. In addition, supply-side thrusts (such as increased government consumption expenditure) can lead to higher GDP growth despite a depressed investment climate, which can then send garbled messages about improved capital productivity. Ordinarily, a falling ICOR should be accompanied by palpable technological improvements and skill enhancements, leading to an all-round increase in productivity and efficiency.

Discussions on capital productivity seem to be back in fashion because high ICOR in recent times (higher than six during 2013-16) have been complemented by sluggish economic growth, over-leveraged corporate balance sheets and burgeoning bad debts in the financial sector. These factors have dragged down the economy’s growth impulses. In all discussions on efficiency and factor productivity, it is usually Indian labour that has to bear the cross. But this time the focus is squarely on capital productivity.

Obsessing with high ICOR becomes necessary when resolution of non-performing assets (NPAs) tops the public policy agenda. Most of the reasons behind high Icor in India are similar to those found elsewhere in the world, but one unique Indian feature stands out: gold-plating, or padded-up project costs. This not only suppresses capital productivity but also distorts the viability of many projects. With institutions and regulators orchestrating Operation NPA Clean-Up in mission mode—for example, the newly-instituted Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India is already grappling with 35 transactions—it is imperative that all resolution mechanisms incorporate enough measures to deter future projects from gold-plating costs and getting away with it.

The above article was published in Mint newspaper and can also be read here

Thursday, 13 December 2012

Boost Savings, Now

The alarm bells should start ringing any time now. An important component of the economy has been sinking and needs to be rescued urgently. This critical piece is “savings” and within this overall head, household savings is the one critical sub-component that needs close watching and nurturing.

While it is true that one of the primary reasons behind the current economic slowdown is the tardy rate of capital expansion – or, investment in infrastructure as well as plant and machinery -- all attempts to stimulate investment activity are likely to come to a nought if savings do not grow.  Without any growth in the savings rate, it is futile to think of any spurt in investment and, consequently, in the overall economic growth. If we source all the investment funding from overseas, it might be plausible to contemplate investment growth without any corresponding rise in savings rate. But, that is unlikely to happen.

Within the overall savings universe, the sub-component “household savings” is most critical. It provides the bulk of the savings in the economy with private corporate savings and government saving contributing the balance. The worrying factor is the near-stagnation in household savings over the past 8 years or so. What’s even more disconcerting is the fact that household savings remained almost standstill during the go-go years of 2004-08.

This seems to be counter-factual.  There are many studies that show that there is a direct relationship between overall economic growth and household savings. Therefore, at a time when India’s GDP was growing by over 9% every year, the household savings rate stayed almost constant at close to 23% of GDP. There was, of course, an increase in absolute terms, but it remained somewhat fixed as a proportion of the GDP.  



Without any growth in the savings rate, it is futile to think of any spurt in investment and, consequently, in the overall economic growth
*As percentage of GDP at current market prices


What is responsible for this contradictory movement? The sub-group on household savings, formed by the working group on savings for the twelfth plan set up by the Planning Commission and chaired by RBI deputy governor Subir Gokarn, has this to say: “...a recent study...had attributed the decline in the household saving ratio in the United Kingdom during 1995 to 2007 to a host of factors such as declining real interest rates, looser credit conditions, increase in asset prices and greater macroeconomic stability...While recognizing that one of the key differences in the evolving household saving scenario between the United Kingdom and India is the impact of demographics (dependency ratio), anecdotal evidence on increasing consumerism and the entrenchment of (urban) lifestyles in India, apart from the easier availability of credit and improvement in overall macroeconomic conditions is perhaps indicative of some ‘drag’ on household saving over the past few years as well as going forward.”

India has another additional facet: a penchant for physical assets (such as bullion or land). Post the monsoon failure of 2009, and the attendant rise in price levels which has now become somewhat deeply entrenched, Indians have been stocking up on gold. Consequently, savings in financial instruments dropped while those in physical assets shot up. This is also disquieting for policy planners because savings in physical assets stay locked in and are unavailable to the economy for investment activity.

There is a counter view which says that higher economic growth does not necessarily lead to higher savings. According to a paper published by Ramesh Jangili (Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, Summer 2011), while economic growth doesn’t inevitably lead to higher savings, the reciprocal causality does hold true. “It is empirically evident that the direction of causality is from saving and investment to economic growth collectively as well as individually and there is no causality from economic growth to saving and (or) investment.”

Whichever camp you belong to, it is beyond any doubt that savings growth is a necessary pre-condition for promoting economic growth. The Planning Commission estimates that an investment of $1 trillion or over Rs 50 lakh crore will be required for the infrastructure sector alone. And, a large part of this critical investment will have to be made from domestic savings.

With savings -- particularly household savings – currently languishing, preliminary forms of the crisis is already showing up across different places. For instance, the lack of incremental addition to the savings reservoir is resulting in a liquidity crisis of sorts, thereby constraining the central bank’s actions. With deposit growth trailing credit growth, Reserve Bank has been forced to focus its efforts on ensuring adequate liquidity in the system. Hence, the repeated cuts in reserve requirements over the past few months.

The government has one Budget before it sets out for the 2014 general elections.  Reserve Bank has two shots before that -- its mid-quarter review on December 18 and the third quarter sometime in end-January, early February. Some solutions will be required to make households save more.

Traditionally, tax breaks were used to lure in savers. With the precarious state of the fiscal, policy experts will have to find innovative ways to provide tax breaks without jeopardising the fine balance. Second, inflation has to brought under control to wean households away from physical assets. Finally, ways must be found to ensure that some legacy savings sources – such as pension, insurance -- become more attuned to investor needs. Today, the real return from these sources is negative or just marginally positive.


Published as an Op-Ed in The Economic Times (December 13, 2012)