Fault Lines in the Indian Banking Industry

Both the PNB fraud and the Rotomac case underline how fund diversions were overlooked, but what’s distressing is how no alarm bells were sounded, no red flags were raised

Two things occur with metronomic regularity in the Indian banking sector: scams and committee reports. One, perhaps, follows from the other.

The Indian banking story, whether pre- or post-nationalization, has been an unfortunate hostage to a long catalogue of scams and frauds. The discovery of each scam is usually followed up with a flurry of committees and reports, rule reversals and a systems overhaul. A few years lapse in all this frenetic activity, a sharp light is focused on the scam area and just about when everybody starts getting complacent, another scam hits the industry. The entire round-robin league is replayed all over again.

The modus vivendi is common: exploit the system’s weakest link. There is another common thread in all the scams: diversion of funds. Both the Punjab National Bank (PNB) and Bank of Baroda (BoB) scams—the Nirav Modi and Rotomac cases, respectively—underline how fund diversions were overlooked; what’s distressing is how no alarm bells were sounded, nor red flags raised, despite an obvious piling up of operational, human and market risks that have debilitated two of India’s stronger public sector banks. Unfortunately, this seems to have become the default template for Indian banking scams, underscoring wide gaps in the regulatory framework. A cursory glance at scams since 1990 show how each episode methodically leveraged regulatory and supervision gaps.

The Harshad Mehta scam coincided with the dawn of India’s economic reforms. Mehta exploited the manual and antiquated settlement systems in trading of government securities. Taking advantage of a few pliant bank officers, Mehta conducted gilts trade between different banks using forged documents and diverted proceeds to prop up untenable equities positions. The scam-tainted large public sector banks (State Bank of India), foreign banks (Standard Chartered), small private banks (Bank of Karad, now extinct), corporate behemoths and sundry securities markets intermediaries.

A decade later, Ketan Parekh—ironically Harshad Mehta’s protégé—replicated almost the same methods: divert funds from the banking system through fraudulent methods to sustain equity market positions. KP would obtain pay-orders from Ahmedabad-based Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank without providing sufficient collateral. He would discount these pay-orders with Bank of India in Mumbai and use the proceeds to ramp up shares. The house of cards eventually collapsed when bear traders hammered KP’s favourite stocks and Madhavpura’s outstanding pay-orders exceeded its ability to repay Bank of India.

Here’s another familiar story: Sanjay Agarwal, former CEO of Lloyds Brokerage, created portal Home Trade in 2000 but was forced to go on the run a year later. Agarwal had inserted himself into the world of cooperative banks, promising to invest in gilts on their behalf and delivering lucrative trading returns. Instead, he diverted the money without delivering the securities or providing the promised returns. The charade continued till one of the cooperative banks complained about not receiving the promised securities.

In recent times, Winsome Diamonds and Jewellery Ltd allegedly used standby letters of credit to divert Rs7,000 crore. Winsome Group promoter Jatin Mehta shares another common strain with Nirav Modi: both have ostensibly become citizens of Saint Kitts and Nevis islands in the Caribbean, which does not have an extradition treaty with India.

Many more similar banking scams have occurred and gone undetected for long periods till the final moment of denouement. One trend is unmistakeable: money is diverted out of the banking system with the active connivance of either the bank’s senior management or a couple of rogue officers. This is what makes both the PNB and BoB cases incredulous: with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) putting so much emphasis on anti-money laundering mechanisms, and with an increasing number of prosecutions against either money laundering or diversion of bank funds, it is indeed curious how both the banks persisted with lax risk mitigation and supervision frameworks.

This also then begs the question: how is it that so many similar scams occur with such frequency, especially when RBI is such a hands-on regulator and supervisor? Every small action needs RBI approval, be it a CEO’s annual bonus, bank management’s decision to nominate a senior executive to the board or to open a branch in a city. Yet, copycat scams continue with ineluctable monotony.

Each time a scam occurs, committees are set up and numerous studies take place. Even now, post the PNB scandal, RBI has set up a committee under chartered accountant Yezdi H. Malegam to examine the increasing number of frauds in the banking system, the measures that will be needed to prevent them (including technological solutions), the role and efficacy of various audits currently conducted in banks to mitigate such frauds and the growing divergence between RBI and bank assessments on asset quality.

Many similar committees were set up earlier and voluminous reports submitted; yet, sadly, they are never enough to prevent future scams.

Next episode: what could be the probable reasons for the recurrence of such scams.

The above article was originally published in Mint newspaper and can be read here

Feels Like Scam Season Once Again

The belated discovery of a moon-size crater inside Punjab National Bank (PNB) opens up many fronts and leaves multiple questions unanswered. What’s more, the extent of damages is still evolving and could multiply as individual strands of the multi-layered transactions are extricated.

The overall outlook is also not that encouraging: the spaghetti bowl of interconnected transactions could result in a number of tangled legal disputes that could take some time to unravel. India’s largest commercial bank, the public sector State Bank of India, has just disclosed it has a $212 million exposure. In all, it feels like scam season once again!

The PNB episode seems to replicate all the steps observed in previous bank scams and carries echoes of similar collusions and cover-ups; what remains to be seen now is whether there is a flurry of post-scam reports from Reserve Bank of India (RBI) or Joint Parliament Committees, reminiscent of the Harshad Mehta scam.

To be sure, there will be much hand-wringing and chest-beating, new rounds of regulatory measures, additional layers of risk management processes and documentation followed through with an endless stream of circulars, guidelines and rules. And yet, all this will be secondary to human ingenuity which will always find a way through this thicket of paperwork and red tape.

The PNB incident highlights the problems of over-reliance on systems, processes and paperwork, indicating that if somehow some boxes are ticked, the problems will go away. While it might be too early to conclude that senior management was involved in the scam, it is clear that there were multiple failures at various levels. It might be informative to try and disentangle this skein of multiple threads.

First, and most baffling, how did the senior management members, the board directors and the auditors (external and internal) miss something of this size? Agreed that the liability was contingent but the liability was over `11,340 crore; that is over 25 per cent of the bank’s total capital. Any contingent liability of this size to one client or single entity should have set alarm bells ringing. At the least, it should have merited an examination of the account.

It also transpires from documents filed by PNB officials with CBI and with stock exchanges that Nirav Modi’s diamond firms—Diamonds R Us, Solar Exports, Stellar Diamonds—were caught out on 16 January 2018, when they went to seek buyer’s credit to make payments to overseas suppliers. Their calculations did not include the possibility of having to deal with a new set of bank managers.

The company management apparently bristled when the new manager asked them to provide 100 per cent cash margin for availing the facility because they did not have a sanctioned limit with the bank. In simple language, the new manager wanted Nirav Modi & Co to keep cash equivalent to the loan amount since they had not gone through the usual process of submitting to due diligence from the bank’s credit appraisal team.

This raises two questions. One: How did they manage for so long without obtaining a formal sanctioned facility with the bank? But more importantly, how did they manage to raise so many loans in foreign currency for so long without providing any security? Many institutions are known to provide a one-off facility based on business judgement and yield calculations. But Nirav Modi’s companies seemingly had unfettered access to the bank’s facilities. This does indicate some level of senior acquiescence.

Second, the ignorance is all the more appalling because Nirav Modi used PNB’s instruments to construct a web of multi-layered liabilities. This again could not have been possible without somebody up and down the chain noticing it. The notion that the PNB officers colluding with Nirav Modi kept the deals off the books also seems difficult to swallow since the counter-party banks on which the Letters of Undertaking (LoUs) were raised (Allahabad Bank or Axis Bank in Hong Kong) would have sent multiple deal stubs back to various parts of PNB’s risk management matrix—front, middle or back offices—for settlement and reconciliation. Even if we discount the possibility of complicity, it is a colossal systemic failure, one that has ripple effects across the industry.

In its letter to the stock exchanges, PNB claims: “The bank liability is contingent only. The liability shall be decided based on the law of land.” In other words, the liability is not known till there is legal clarity on who owes how much to whom. This seems to indicate that PNB senses a long-drawn legal battle ahead. But a cursory look at PNB’s website seems to indicate it’s business as usual—it is difficult to find PNB’s own press releases, the MD’s message to assuage investors and customers, or even the reports filed with stock exchanges. It is perhaps this lack of communication within the institution that kept the scam going undetected for so long.

But when all is done and dusted, two crucial questions remain unanswered. One, how all those accused of money laundering—Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi, arms dealer Sanjay Bhandari—are able to leave the country just before a first information report is filed, or the enforcement directorate carries out raids on their homes and offices? Second, and this has national security implications: if Nirav Modi was not accompanying PM Narendra Modi to Davos as part of his official delegation as the government said, how did he photobomb a group portrait? He is standing an arm’s length away from Modi; is the PM’s security so lax that anybody hanging around in the vicinity can be allowed to stand in an official group photograph with him?

This article was originally published in New Indian Express newspaper. You can also read it here